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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a review of financial economics literature and offers a comprehensive discussion 
and systematisation of determinants of financial capital use. In congruence with modern financial 
literature, it is acknowledged here that real and financial capital decisions are interdependent. While 
the fundamental role of the (unconstrained) demand for real capital in the demand for finance is 
acknowledged, the deliverable focuses on three complementary categories of the determinants of 
financial capital use: i) capital market imperfections; ii) factors mitigating these imperfections or their 
impacts; and iii) firm- and sector-related factors, which alter the severity of financial constraints and 
their effects. To address the question of the optimal choice of financial instruments, theories of firm 
capital structure are reviewed. The deliverable concludes with theory-derived implications for 
agricultural and non-agricultural rural business’ finance. 
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Determinants of Financial Capital Use 
Review of theories and implications 
for rural businesses 
Jarmila Curtiss * 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 19/February 2012 
1. Introduction 
Farmers’ access to financial capital can directly affect their access to real capital. 
Without efficient financial capital markets, farmers might delay adopting more 
efficient technologies as they become available. Agricultural capital markets also 
allow farmers to pursue profitable investment opportunities without having to save 
the necessary funds or sacrifice their own current standard of living. As such, 
financial markets enable the movement of purchasing power and productive assets to 
those who can use them most profitably. This accelerates efficiency gains in 
agricultural production and farm management, and thus improves overall 
agricultural productivity (Collender and Morehart, 2004, p. 41). 
Numerous empirical studies indeed indicate that rural financial systems often work 
imperfectly (e.g., Carter, 1988; Benjamin and Phimister, 1997; Bierlen et al., 1998; Petrick, 
2004; Blancard et al., 2006). These systems supply funds to farms for their agricultural and 
diversified activities in insufficient amounts and on terms that differ according to socially 
desirable levels of production and investment. This leads to under-investment, under-
employment of production factors and underproduction, which together suppress the rate of 
return on investments, technology adoption, and productivity (Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992; 
Vasavada and Chambers, 1996; Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Barry et al., 2000). At the 
individual farm household level, credit constraints can affect resource allocation decisions, 
influence a household’s well-being and have important consequences for policy outcomes 
(Briggeman et al., 2009). 
The various sources of capital market imperfections, including information asymmetries, 
transaction costs or weak property rights, are likely to be augmented by specific impediments 
related to agricultural and rural undertakings. These impediments encompass financial 
specificities of agriculture and rural small businesses, such as their low returns to capital and 
spatial dispersion, or agricultural production and product market uncertainties. These 
sectoral and regional characteristics discourage private investments and hinder access to 
loans. There is thus a need for the institutional support of financial capital supply, as well as 
more concerted efforts in coordinating rural capital demand.  
This paper will provide a comprehensive overview of financial economics, to new 
institutional economics approaches, and financial decision-making in firms. The main 
purpose of the review is to identify main determinants of financial capital use. By revising the 
financial effects of firm and sector characteristics, this paper aims to identify financial 
characteristics of agriculture and non-agricultural rural businesses.  
                                                        
* Jarmila Curtiss, Senior Researcher, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (IAMO). 
Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank Mario Veneziani, of the Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore for his constructive comments on a previous version of the document, and Alfons 
Balmann, Director, IAMO, for inspiring discussions on the topic. 
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Based on the financial economics theory, in a perfect capital market, demand for physical 
capital is independent of conditions of financial capital supply. Therefore, the demanded 
amount of financial capital would fully correspond with the optimal level of real capital 
demand. That demand for real capital is the principal driver behind the demand for financial 
capital is, therefore, fully acknowledged. Financial capital market imperfection can, however, 
affect the effective demand for physical capital in a form of non-optimal capitalisation, or 
higher investment sensitivity to the level of firm internal funds, thereby limiting and 
postponing physical capital acquisition and technology adoption. This constraining effect and 
widespread evidence of capital market imperfections provides the motivation to devote a 
substantial part of this paper to capital market imperfections and to the effect of financial 
constraints on the choice between the sources of financial capital. In other words, much of 
the paper explores the question of optimal capital structure. 
The deliverable is structured as follows. The following chapter presents a short discussion of 
the main sources of financial capital. Chapter 3 delivers a discussion of the determinants of 
financial capital use, and identifies four categories: i) determinants of optimal 
(unconstrained) demand for real capital; ii) sources of capital market imperfections; iii) 
factors mitigating these imperfections or their impacts; and iv) firm- and production-related 
factors, which change the severity of the financial constraints and/or their effects. Since the 
first category of determinants is the subject of deliverable 4.2, this deliverable focuses on the 
other three categories of determinants of financial capital use. Chapter 4 reviews theories of 
capital structure choice, because related to the issue of financial capital use is not only the 
question of its volume, but also its structure. These theories, starting with financial 
economics approaches and ranging to new institutional approaches, consider various 
combinations of factors as determining the optimal capital structure, as discussed in Chapter 
3. Subsequently, chapter 5 transmits the collected knowledge to the case of agricultural and 
non-agricultural rural business and presents their main financial characteristics. The final 
chapter of this document delivers a short summary and concluding remarks.    
2. Sources of financial capital 
In finance and accounting, the term "financial capital" refers to the purchasing power or 
medium that represents saved-up financial wealth, usually in the form of currency, which is 
used by firms or individual entrepreneurs to invest - to start or develop a business, i.e. to 
purchase or acquire physical capital. Physical capital comprises physical goods such as 
machinery equipment, stalls or office equipment and buildings that are repeatedly used over 
several production cycles. This capital is accumulated to produce goods or to provide services 
mainly with the intent of receiving income and/or achieving capital gains. Financial capital, 
representing free purchasing power, then allows firms to pursue profitable investment 
opportunities, without having to save the necessary funds (Collender and Morehart, 2004). 
There are various sources of financial capital that vary in their characteristics. Particularly in 
imperfect capital markets, the costs of and risks related to various financial sources will differ 
and establish the need to optimise the capital structure. This section introduces the main 
sources of finance, as they represent a recurring theme throughout the paper. 
The two most important sources of financial capital are debt and equity. Debt represents 
credit from a lender, also known as creditor, and is created when a creditor agrees to lend a 
sum of assets to a debtor (borrower). Debt encompasses any form of a deferred payment for 
provided resources; the resources provided may be financial (e.g. granting a loan), or they 
may consist of goods or services (e.g. consumer credit). Lenders usually grant capital finance 
with expected repayment, plus a price (interest). Lenders also commonly gain a limited form 
of control over the operation of the firm1, but the contractual agreement formulating the 
                                                        
1 Debt holdings may also offer some measure of control to the investor if the company is a fledgling 
start-up or an old giant undergoing 'restructuring'. Further, under extreme adversity, financial 
contracts are designed so that ownership and control revert to the debt holders (according to seniority 
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL USE | 3 
 
lender-borrower relationship has strong enforcement power. For example, if interest 
payments are missed, the creditors may take control of the company and liquidate it to 
recover some of their investment. Debt can be acquired from financial institutions such as 
commercial banks, finance companies, credit unions, or other non-traditional financial 
institutions, which are intermediaries managing deposits from individuals and businesses 
and offering them to productive use in firms or by entrepreneurs in diverse forms of debt 
securities (longer-term funds), from standard credits to micro-credits. Debt can be also 
obtained from non-financial sources, for example, from suppliers of goods and services in the 
supply chain (trade credit), or from other businesses (inter-enterprise credit) and individuals 
on informal markets, as well as from governments. Also, the principal owner can be a lender 
to the business he/she is the principal owner of. 
Equity financing a business’s investment projects represents a direct increase in the 
business’s own capital. Financial capital that is required for the start-up of a business is 
mainly equity that is contributed by the entrepreneur or co-owners of a business, and 
obtained, for example, by means of savings or inheritance. In a more advanced stage of a 
firm's life cycle, equity is typically acquired through external investment. Investors who 
directly finance new assets (physical capital) generally acquire share ownership, together 
with some form of control over the firm. Equity holders own and control the firm’s assets, 
although ultimate control is determined by the type of equity (e.g., voting versus non-voting 
stock, preferred versus common stock, limited versus general partners) (Barry and Robison, 
2001). As profits are made by the business, equity investors either get paid their portion in 
profits through cash dividends or the profits are retained by the business (invested into 
physical capital), which adds to the value of the equity and the value of per-owner capital 
share (Kriz et al., 2000).  
After the initial equity financed by the principal owner and the start-up team (insider), 
businesses often obtain equity for their successive growth from high net worth family 
members, friends or acquaintances on the so-called angel market. As another equity source, 
venture capital represents intermediated funds that are provided on more formal markets 
than angel finance markets2. These markets are often referred to as private equity markets. 
After achieving considerable size, businesses gain access to equity through issuing publicly-
traded stocks on the stock exchange. This size stage is only rarely achieved or aimed at by 
agricultural companies that are active in primary production (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Debt and equity require different institutions for delivery (Kriz et al., 2000). To facilitate the 
effective functioning of financial institutions and good credit contract design, various 
institutions and mechanisms are required. For example, there is a need for government 
oversight and deposit insurance mechanisms that would inspire confidence in individuals to 
provide deposits, legal regulations that provide for the proper enforcement of contracts, 
accounting standards that would enable accurate determinations of borrower 
creditworthiness, or risk management tools such as property and casualty insurance that 
would allow borrowers to protect their capital assets from loss. Risk management is as 
important for equity as it is for debt financing. Furthermore, in the case of equity, contract 
enforcement is important because an ownership interest must be delineated and protected.  
Another example of a legal institution that is important for equity investing is the protection 
of limited liability for owners in a corporate or limited partnership form. Accounting 
standards are also important for equity financing because those investors who provide capital 
must be able to properly value their share of equity in the business enterprise at any time.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
and size of claims). Debt capital thus represents a form of contingent ownership of the firm (Barry and 
Robison, 2001: 522). 
2 The use of the term "venture capital" is not uniform. Sometimes it refers to any equity investment in 
a new or early stage venture, including angel finance. However, we will distinguish between the 
informal angel finance market and the formal intermediated venture capital market to increase the 
clarity of the financial sources (similar to, for example, Berger and Udell, 1998). 
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The relationship between debt and equity is an important criterion for the business to qualify 
for a debt contract and to control its risks of bankruptcy. Companies that are highly 
leveraged, that is, that use a high ratio of borrowed money to equity, may be at risk of 
bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments on their debt; they may also be unable to 
find new lenders in the future. However, financial leverage can also facilitate acquisition of 
complementary capital to equity capital, which can increase the shareholders' return on their 
investment. Often, tax advantages are also associated with borrowing. Equity, which 
represents the level of assets (often tangible assets), can also act as collateral and facilitator of 
the availability of debt. In this case, equity is in complementary position to debt.  
Alternative forms of capital financing also exist, and among these leasing is particularly 
worth mentioning in the context of agriculture. Leasing does not represent an ownership 
claim of the firm but a right to use physical capital (assets) under specified conditions 
(Collender and Morehart, 2004) different to conditions of a debt or equity contract. Lease 
contracts are usually perceived by the theoretical literature as a standardised type of financial 
instrument that is economically equivalent to other methods of acquiring assets, except for its 
tax ramification. Empirical studies, however, suggest that leasing is a more expensive method 
of acquiring assets relative to standard debt purchase instruments (Ben-Yosef, 1988); this is 
likely due to the fact that lessors (providers and owners of assets) are not restricted by 
interest rate ceilings (Nair, 2010), and also due to insurance payments that are included in 
the lease price. On the other hand, leasing also offers specific advantages. For traditional 
credit, enterprises require assets that can serve as collateral, which is not the case (or at least 
to a degree) for leasing financing, where the primary form of security is the leased 
equipment. In addition, leases often require lower down-payments than the equity required 
for loans, and therefore are more accessible for enterprises that have limited liquid funds 
(Nair, 2010). 
Many of the presented characteristics and considerations of financing mainly through equity 
and debt will be discussed from a theoretical perspective in Chapters 3 and 4. 
3. Determinants of financial capital use 
The determinants of financial capital use can be categorised into four groups: i) determinants 
of optimal (unconstrained) demand for real capital; ii) financial capital use constraining 
factors, which are factors associated with capital market imperfections; iii) factors mitigating 
these imperfections or their impacts; and iv) firm- and production-related factors, which 
change the severity of the financial constraints.  
Since the first category of determinants is discussed in deliverable 4.2., this deliverable 
focuses of the remaining three categories. This chapter follows this categorisation. By 
acknowledging the existence of transaction costs, liquidity constraints or information and 
incentive asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, investors and firms or shareholders 
and managers, it can be claimed that the most natural state of capital markets is 
imperfection. Addressing and mitigating the costly effects of capital market imperfections 
and the resulting financial constraints requires the origins of the capital market 
imperfections to be identified, including incentives conflicts, transaction costs, risk, property 
and control rights. It is also necessary to know if/why there is any kind of systemic variability 
in these imperfections between firms, productions or sectors. This chapter reviews the 
theoretical literature addressing capital market imperfections, and aims to identify the main 
factors that hinder efficient functioning of the capital markets. The chapter also reviews 
instruments that could mitigate these imperfections or their consequences, and could 
facilitate a more efficient allocation and use of financial capital and thus lead to the 
development of competitive agricultural and rural businesses. Moreover, it discusses 
characteristics of firms and production, such as firm size and asset specificity, which are 
generally accepted as factors that alter the severity of financial constraints and that require 
different capital (governance) structures were the objectives of cost minimisation followed. 
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3.1 Capital market imperfections 
The basic perfect capital market assumptions refer to a frictionless market condition, perfect 
competition in product and securities markets, (i.e., all producers and consumers are price-
takers), information efficiency (equal access to market prices and information), and rational 
agents (investors) (e.g., Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963; Rubinstein, 1973). Markets are 
considered frictionless if there is no transaction cost, which implies that the borrowing rate 
equals the lending rate, no taxes, and all assets are perfectly divisible and marketable; this 
also suggests that human capital is non-existent (is not divisible and cannot be owned as an 
asset), and there are no constraining regulations (Mathiesen, 2011). Information efficiency 
refers to information being costless and received simultaneously by all individuals; investors 
are perfectly rational and use it to maximise their utility. In this context, it is also assumed 
that all agents who act in the interest of principles (investors), i.e., managers, always 
maximise the shareholders’ wealth, thus there are no agency costs borne by principles. 
Violation of any of these assumptions can, therefore, be considered a source of capital market 
imperfections. 
3.1.1 Incentive conflicts and information asymmetries  
One of the main and most frequently addressed source of capital market imperfection is the 
infringed condition of information efficiency due to information asymmetries between the 
principles (lenders, shareholders, or landowner) and the agents (borrower, manager, 
tenants). In the context of agriculture, the lender-borrower relationship is particularly 
important due to the predominantly small size of agricultural business (Barry and Robison, 
2001).  
In their influential paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that the presence of informational 
inefficiencies on the credit market could lead to credit rationing and market failures. Due to 
information asymmetries, the lender may lack information about the borrower’s objectives as 
well as the risks of the foreseen investment project. Farmers representing the borrowers 
(agents in the debt financing relationship) then dispose of discretion over the true farm 
financial position and productivity, and can withhold from the lenders information about 
repayment intentions. The asymmetries between the lender and the borrower in both the 
information and incentive structures are sources of specific concerns to the lender (Barry and 
Robison, 2001). Firstly, it is uncertain whether the agent is riskier than believed, and 
presented to be, during the closing of the loan contract, which reflects a problem referred to 
in the literature as the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970; Wilson, 1979; Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1979).  
Secondly, it is not known whether the agent (borrower) will take on greater risk during the 
term of the contract (loan) than was originally anticipated, which represents the so-called 
moral hazard problem (Holmström, 1979). In the case of a credit, borrowers are provided 
with adverse selection incentives for borrowing over using their own current or future 
resources, since they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. The consequences of 
a borrower’s investment projects-related actions that could lead to a default are borne by the 
lender, at least to the degree or share bound to the credit contract. With an increasing debt-
to-equity ratio, a borrower then has an increasing incentive to take more profitable but also 
riskier actions and increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. This would lead to high costs to the 
lenders, as he/she would bear the transaction costs of liquidation as well as lost profit, which 
originally motivated the lender-borrower contract. The lender is thus motivated to increase 
control over a borrower’s actions and specialise in the sector he/she invests in to reduce these 
monitoring costs. However, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show, reducing the costs of and 
losses from bad loans, it may be optimal for imperfectly-informed banks to ration3 the 
volume of loans instead of raising the lending rate, as would be predicted by classical 
                                                        
3 Credit rationing resulting from information and incentive asymmetries in the credit market refers to 
a situation where demanded volume of credit exceeds its supply.  
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economic analysis. The credit rationing that results from information asymmetries can, 
however, also result in underfunding firms with high returns on proposed investment 
projects, and thereby constraining the value of production, technological progress and thus 
productivity growth (e.g., Hubbard and Kashyap 1992; Vasavada and Chambers 1996; Bierlen 
and Featherstone 1998). Factors mitigating the credit market that are affected by severe 
information and incentive inefficiencies thus become important for the efficient use of firms’ 
productive capacities.  
Nevertheless, as Colombo and Driffill (2003) argue, for credit rationing to have an effective 
consequence for the economic system, credit market inefficiencies also have to be 
accompanied by some inefficiencies of the equity market. They referred to Greenwald et al. 
(1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), who consider the possibility of substituting credit with 
equity. These authors showed that, as with the credit market, informational failures could 
also initiate adverse selection in the equity market, which would reduce the substitutability 
option. As suggested above, this double issue of information asymmetries for the capital 
market is often neglected in the case of agriculture because of the small-scale farm tradition, 
which generally rejects the possibility of growth by means of acquiring equity financing and 
shared ownership. However, the small-scale farm structure is not unique or dominant in all 
EU member states; therefore, the information and incentive asymmetries are also of concern 
with regard to the equity market.   
In the context of equity market, the principal agent relationship extends to the relationship 
between an investor (stockholder) and a firm. Myers and Majluf (1984) have shown how 
shareholders may have to bear the costs of adverse selection among firms. In new sectors, a 
few investors (insiders) may have good information about the future profitability of new 
firms. The rest of the investors are uninformed and may thus perceive the new firms’ 
financial prospects as being close to identical. Because of this and because uninitiated 
investors also trade on the stock market, firms with less than average profitability will be 
overvalued. Such firms will, therefore, prefer to finance new projects by issuing new shares 
(as opposed to debt), while firms with higher than average profitability will find it costly to 
finance new projects by share issue, as they will be undervalued (Löfgren et al., 2002).  
Regarding the equity market for smaller firms, which is more relevant for agriculture, the 
small firm information opacity represents even more severe problem for investors. The public 
equity market signals a firm’s financial performance, for example, by means of share price 
development or dividend payments and stringent financial (accountancy) reporting, tools 
that are not available on the private equity market for smaller firms. Information 
asymmetries thus represent a more severe source of market imperfections than in public 
equity market, which explains why angel or venture capital investors are mostly specialists in 
the given sector or undertaking branch, and can get involved in temporary management 
capacity to prevent adverse selection problems (see, for example, Berg and Udell, 1998).4   
It became common knowledge that information asymmetries and incentive compatibility 
problems in both credit and equity markets result in higher costs of external financing and 
lead to firms’ higher dependency on internal financing (Blancard et al., 2006).     
3.1.2 Weak property rights and incomplete contracting 
The conditions under which financial capital is provided and acquired are formulated in a 
contract between the financier and the firm or entrepreneur. The drafters of the contract, 
however, face the difficulty of anticipating and including conditions that reflect the many 
contingencies which may arise during the course of the contractual relationship, and which 
makes them likely to end up writing an incomplete contract (Hart and Moore, 1988). This 
insufficient information about the future 'state of the world' and the asymmetric information 
between the parties in the contractual relationship that forms during the course of the 
                                                        
4 The issue of small firm finance is developed in more detail in Section 4.1.5. 
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contract could suggest a full overlap with the previously discussed concept of information 
asymmetries in financial relationships. However, there is a distinction between the problems 
that arise from information asymmetries and contractual incompleteness. While certain 
contingent statements in the contract are infeasible because of differences in information 
available to the parties of the contract, in the case of incomplete contracts, the parties may 
have the same information; however, the (transaction) cost of processing and using the 
information prevents the use of a complete contingent contract (Hart and Moore, 1988). The 
problems of incomplete contracting and related transaction costs have important 
implications for the efficiency of a long-term economic relationship and offer possible 
rationalisation of the emergence of various types of cost-optimising institutions (Williamson, 
1985, 1989 and Klein et al., 1978). 
Aside from incomplete contracting, this section considers the problem of weak property 
rights; it builds on the proposition that i) property rights are fundamental for the efficiency of 
economic activities, since entrepreneurs will not invest if they expect to be unable to keep the 
fruits of their investment (Johnson et al., 2002), and that ii) property rights are subject to 
incomplete contracts that will hinder the full incentive power of possessing the property right 
and introducing risk. The objective of the contract should be to bring about a perfect 
coincidence of objectives between both parties (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), optimise the 
allocation of control and risk, and thus minimise space for adverse (opportunistic) behaviour. 
Assuming the availability of a mechanism to enable contract renegotiation, the contracts are 
expected to be adjusted, and property rights possibly relocated with improving information 
and knowledge of the state of the word.  
Among other things, financial contracts specify property (control) rights and relative claims 
on the firm’s assets and earnings. As discussed in Chapter 2, the specifications of the control 
rights5 and the relative claims on the firm’s assets and earnings significantly vary between the 
two most standard financial instruments, debt and equity. Equity holders own and control 
the firm’s assets, while the debt capital contract does not entitle financiers to ownership of a 
firm’s assets, or entitles them only to an ownership contingent upon extreme adversity (Barry 
and Robison, 2001). The question naturally arising for a situation of incomplete contracting 
(i.e. providing for residual control rights) is: How should control rights be allocated to 
achieve efficiency of the action subject to contractual relationship? Aghion and Bolton (1992) 
show that an entrepreneur (equity holder) should have residual control rights in states of the 
world where his private benefits are relatively high, and the investor (lender) should have 
control in states where the entrepreneur's private benefits are relatively low. This can mainly 
be explained by the notion that the equity (residual control) holder will exercise effort 
proportionate to the anticipated rewards. In states where the entrepreneur's private benefits 
from his efforts are relatively low, the entrepreneur may choose go-for-broke actions, which 
may yield adverse effects that accrue more to the lender. Therefore, from the perspective of 
the contract’s economic performance, the residual right of control associated with ownership 
should be shifted to the lender so that s/he can exert appropriate effort to protect his/her 
debt claims.6 Therefore, debt and equity can also be considered post-contractual governance 
structures that arise due to incomplete contracting (Williamson, 1988, 1993; Grossman and 
Hart, 1986). 
3.1.3 Transaction costs 
Capital markets can be affected by explicit transaction costs, such as the various fees 
associated with credit application processing that lenders charge borrowers (Miller et al., 
                                                        
5 The control rights that are not designated by the contract or the law are residual control rights that 
always stay with the equity owner (Barry and Robison, 2001). 
6 For more literature that analyses financial decisions from an incomplete contracting perspective, see, 
for example, Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore 
(1990), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Berglof (1990), or Hart and Moore (1998). For more recent 
literature, see, for example, de Bettignies (2008). 
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1993). However, implicit transaction costs also have an impact on financial decisions and 
form of financing. For example, the preceding section illuminated the role of transaction 
costs of processing and using all available information in designing a contract, which result in 
incomplete contracting. Post-contractual transaction costs related to costs of liquidation due 
to asset specificity as originally conceptualised by Williamson (1985, 1989) will be discussed 
in a later section on the role of asset specificity. Section 3.3.1 will discuss managerial 
transaction cost (firm internal agency costs), which are agency costs of free cash flow 
dispersion, replacement resistance, resistance to profit liquidation or merger, power 
struggles, excessive risk-taking, excessive diversification, excessive growth, etc. (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The implicit transaction costs further include costs imposed on borrowers 
related to efforts to reduce information asymmetries, for example, the costs of preparing 
accounts, as well as financial plans, which would provide lenders with information on a 
borrower’s financial status (Benjamin and Phimister, 1997). Together with search and 
information costs, the transaction costs of capital stock adjustment are often considered to 
result in gradual rather than instant adjustment of a firm’s stock of capital to its desired 
equilibrium (Bierlen et al. 1998). The adjustment costs thus have an impact on the form of 
demanded financial capital, particularly the length of repayment obligations for individual 
debt securities.  
Even if transaction costs can theoretically affect both demand and supply sides of the capital 
market, the above examples suggest that they tend to be mainly borne by agents on the 
demand side. Transaction costs that would occur to suppliers of finance are transmitted into 
higher security prices or interest rate levels, or result in finance rationing. Transaction costs 
can thus cause long-lasting misalignments between the price and the fundamental value of a 
security and distort both security (financial source) choice and allocation.  
3.2 Factors mitigating capital markets imperfections 
3.2.1 Financial intermediation and market institutions for the exchange of 
financial information 
Information asymmetries in capital markets justify and widen the role of financial 
intermediation. Without intermediaries in credit markets, borrowers would have difficulty 
finding lenders. Intermediaries such as banks, credit unions (cooperatives), or micro-credit 
institutions help in this process. These intermediaries take deposits from those (individuals, 
businesses, municipalities or states) that have money to save. They can then lend money from 
this pool of deposited money to those who seek to borrow. Banks popularly lend money in the 
form of loans and mortgages. Similarly, firms or businesses seeking expansion or 
modernisation of their operation through equity would have difficulty finding private 
investors without equity markets. Intermediaries such as dealers/traders/agents facilitate 
this process. The process of investing in equity involves more complex transactions than 
simple bank deposits and requires markets where primary investors and their agents can 
meet issuers of securities and their agents, and where existing investment commitments can 
be sold on to other parties. Less complex equity markets are the private equity market and 
angels market. A more well-known example of a capital market is a stock exchange, which 
represents the possibility for a company to raise money by selling shares to investors.7 
Intermediaries who were mentioned in the context of both debt and equity securities markets 
play an important role in the effective functioning of the market, as they facilitate the 
discovery of the adequate supply side for the demand side, and vice versa, and help with the 
contractual arrangements of their exchange, thus reducing their transaction costs. Also, 
intermediaries’ specialised knowledge and evaluation standards are expected to increase 
confidence on both sides of the facilitated transactions. Financial intermediation thus brings 
benefits to capital markets through economies of financial variables production, reducing the 
unit transaction costs associated with lending or investing. 
                                                        
7 This and the following paragraphs are based on Berger and Udell (1998). 
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Banks and financial intermediaries are considered not only as channels for transmitting 
monetary and financial variables, but also, and more importantly, as processors of 
information and monitors of borrowers (Colombo and Driffill, 2003: 2). The modern theory 
of financial intermediation suggests that financial intermediation exists in part because of 
economies of scale in information production; that is, they eliminate redundancy in 
information production when numerous small investors pool their funds into an 
intermediary and eliminate the delegation costs associated with financial intermediation 
(Berger and Udell, 1998: 630). Economies of scale in information production hence reduce 
the unit agency costs of information asymmetry to financial principals. In accordance with 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), by pooling the deposits of individuals with uncertain liquidity 
preferences, intermediaries provide a higher degree of liquidity for any given level of returns 
in the portfolio. Hence, they also play the role of providers of insurance services. Another 
function of intermediaries is their provision of risk-sharing services by packaging existing 
claims on behalf of investors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).      
Griffith (2005) also critically argues that if there is an insufficiently competitive market of 
financial institutions, some financial intermediaries (underwriters) can exercise market 
power and use it for implicit price discrimination which brings them benefits. Guriev and 
Kvasov (2009) provide statistics on how a few "global, universal commercial and investment 
banks of new generation" (p. 132) command a substantial share in virtually all financial 
markets (represent oligopoly), including debt and equity issues, which allows them to 
influence their relative prices and thus the demand for one or the other financial source. This 
leads to positive rents for the intermediaries. 
Another mechanism for responding to the problem of information inefficiency is the creation 
of market institutions for the exchange of financial information. For example, credit rating 
companies specialise in collecting and disseminating information about borrowers' 
creditworthiness, or collateral control companies monitor, control, and validate the status of 
specific assets (Barry and Robison, 2001). 
3.2.2 Practices improving incentive alignment  
Suppliers of finance are limited in their options for increasing the quality of information 
provided by potential borrowers; however, they can apply tools to improve borrowers’ 
incentive structure. In response to the adverse selection problem, lenders, for example, can 
apply differential loan pricing based on risk-adjusted interest rates. Nevertheless, adjusting 
interest rates for risk postulates sufficient information that would allow lenders to effectively 
distinguish among the levels of risk of lending to individual borrowers. Therefore, 
information collection, processing, and monitoring are important contributions to the 
resolution of agency cost problems both before and after the loan contract is established 
(Barry and Robison, 2001). 
Extensive financial contracting by lenders represents a non-price method of addressing 
potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Smith and Warner, 1979); it entails 
provisions in a loan contract such as collateral requirements, reporting requirements, 
performance standards, sales restrictions, constraints on additional borrowing, loan 
repayment upon demand provisions, insurance requirements, default penalties, and 
foreclosure conditions (Barry and Robison, 2001). For example, collateral requirements, that 
is, pledging some of the firm’s assets to one debt holder, may attenuate moral hazard by 
reducing the incentives to switch to riskier projects or to reduce effort (Boot et al., 1991). The 
benefits of the collateral requirements in a debt contract to the borrower is that it allows the 
firm to invest in relatively safe projects and may help mitigate the underinvestment problem 
(Stulz and Johnson, 1985), as it may prevent credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987).  
There are also other contractual arrangements that may be utilised by financial institutions to 
help counterbalance information problems such as a loan commitment. A loan commitment, 
for example lines of credit (one form of a loan commitment), is a debt contract that provides 
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revolving credit under pre-specified future terms. The loan commitment specified in the debt 
contract can help resolve adverse selection/moral hazard problems (Berger and Udell, 1998) 
since it is used as an assurance of borrowers' repayment moral and mechanism motivating 
efforts.8 From the borrowers’ perspective, such a credit arrangement can reduce transaction 
costs or provide insurance against credit rationing (Melnik and Plaut, 1986; Avery and 
Berger, 1991).9  
Financial institutions also frequently use covenant-rich loan contracts that are intended for 
them to gain more control over the borrower and prevent the borrower from engaging in risk-
shifting behaviour (Berger and Udell, 1998). Such covenants, which represent debt 
constraints attached to the debt contract, require the borrower to return to the financial 
institution to renegotiate the credit conditions when strategic opportunities arise, or when 
the financial condition of the borrower changes, thus limiting the firm's ability to change its 
financial condition or strategy (Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Carey et al., 1993). It is therefore 
expected that the strictest covenants are expected to be placed on the firms with the most 
credit risk and greatest moral hazard incentives (Berlin and Mester, 1993). The covenants 
can, however, also represent a form of a credit constraint, since the control provided by 
covenants may allow the lender to “hold-up'' the borrower from a higher rate or other 
concessions, even on a positive net present value project (Berger and Udell, 1998). This 
situation can occur particularly if the lender does not specialise in the sector or business 
activity of the borrower.  
Effective covenants generally cannot be imposed on small firms that do not have audited 
financial statements; in such cases, short debt maturities can be used instead (Berger and 
Udell, 1998).  
3.2.3 Practices mitigating information problems 
To lessen information problems, banks and other financial institutions extensively use credit 
evaluation procedures, which work with the relative importance of variables affecting the 
potential borrower’s creditworthiness. Despite significant dissimilarities between the models 
of credit evaluation used by lenders (Barry and Ellinger, 1989), their application is 
widespread. Therefore, this section mainly focuses on practices that mitigate information 
problems and improve access to finance that can be applied by the firms, i.e. the capital 
market demand side. 
To the extent that a firm can establish a mechanism improving information transmission to 
investors, it can attenuate some of the asymmetric information problems and obtain external 
financing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Firms with positive returns on investment that are 
seeking financial capital can be expected to be interested in mitigating information problems. 
Signalling their creditworthiness is one of the possible practices at the borrowers’ disposal. 
Effective financial accounting systems employed by borrowers provide a signal of his/her 
creditworthiness and reduce monitoring costs to the lender (Barry and Robison, 2001). Other 
management practices that distinguish borrowers from their peers, and highlight unique 
skills and levels of productivity are: using futures and options contracts to manage risks; 
producing speciality crops; adopting new production and telecommunication technologies; 
earning advanced levels of education; and establishing a reputation for leadership in local 
                                                        
8 However, as Avery and Berger (1991) state, commitments can also intensify information problems. In 
the lines of credit contracts in which the financial institution agrees to provide credit in advance while 
knowing little about the borrower, the financial institution commits to terms that it would not offer 
after learning more about the borrower. In the case of a spot loan, the financial institution could refuse 
to issue the loan. In the case of lines of credit, the borrower could still, to a degree, be able to risk-shift 
to take advantage of the financial institution. 
9 Lines of credit are very flexible and thus also convenient for the borrower. They are typically used for 
acquiring working capital, rather than financing large and specific investments (Berger and Udell, 
1998, p. 642). 
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communities (Barry and Robison, 2001). In the case of young and small firms, successfully 
introducing and marketing new products (Berger and Udell, 1998) or managing stable 
contractual relationships with downstream agents also provide distinguishing signals 
between higher and lower credit risk-borrowers to providers of finance. In public equity 
markets, for example, venture backing of publicly-traded firms provides positive signalling to 
share investors.  
Another practice used in the context of attenuating information asymmetries when aiming 
for external finance is relationship lending. Forming a longer-term relationship between a 
firm and a lender, thus choosing a firm strategy of staying with one lender despite 
occasionally occurring competitive rates by competing lenders, could reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information in the long run and ensure that profitable investment projects will 
not be rejected by financiers. The monopoly-lender theory (Rajan, 1992) emphasises the fact 
that the information obtained by the bank (also the venture capitalist), through close 
monitoring and learning about the entrepreneur’s ability is its private (discrete) information. 
Over time, these financiers then develop an informational monopoly over the firm they lend 
to, which enables them to earn substantial profits from their lending relationships with the 
entrepreneur (Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Despite the higher price 
for credit under a monopoly-lender relationship, the effect of reducing credit rationing 
(increasing credit availability) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995) and reducing the costs of 
financing transactions (Barry and Robison, 1998) makes the lending relationship attractive 
for the borrowers as well.   
The problem of asymmetric information between the firm and the financier can be further 
moderated by means of credit from nonfinancial institutions to businesses, so-called trade 
credit.10 When compared, for example, to lines of credit, the advantage of trade credit lies in 
alleviating the information problem by incorporating in the lending relation the private 
information held by suppliers11 about their customers and introducing compatible incentives 
of agents in the financial contract (trade partners) (Biais and Gollier, 1997). Despite these 
advantages, however, the trade credit is often offered at much higher interest rates than the 
line of credit from financial institutions. Therefore, it is likely only to be taken in cases in 
which credit limits at financial institutions are exhausted (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Ferris (1981) argues that a small amount of trade credit may be optimal 
from the viewpoint of transaction costs, liquidity and cash management, despite their high 
cost. For example, the line of credit may not be always available to small firms, because of 
their information opacity; therefore Trade credit as a source of mostly working capital 
finance is extremely important especially for small businesses (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
There is some evidence that as small firms age and their relationship with financial 
institutions matures, they become less dependent on trade credit (see Petersen and Rajan, 
1995). On the other hand, Cook’s (1999) findings suggest that in developing economies, trade 
credit delivers a signal that leads to more bank credit. This implies that the informational 
infrastructure and development of the banking system can influence the relationship between 
trade credit and commercial debt. 
Trade credit represents a type of a vertical contracting, which is a contractual alternative to 
vertical financial ownership; both are forms of vertical integration. Similar to trade credit, 
vertical financial ownership can reduce financial constraints, but moreover, it can eliminate 
                                                        
10 Typical trade credit payments are due in full in 30 days, but a discount is presented if payments are 
made within the first 10 days (Smith, 1987; in Berger and Udell, 1998). However, in agriculture, trade 
credits are often arranged for the whole production cycle with payments due after expected production 
market realization (cash inflow). Specific form of an agricultural trade credit from suppliers is a ‘green 
credit’. Under the arrangements of a ‘green credit’, agricultural business repays the credit and interests 
in kind. 
11 There is the possibility that suppliers may know better the small business’ industry and production 
process, or may use leverage in terms of withholding future supplies to solve incentive problems more 
effectively (Biais and Gollier, 1997). 
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any residual incompleteness of the trade credit contract. Thus, vertical ownership represents 
an option for firms wishing to become financially integrated with companies which are not 
financially constrained, or become less constrained after integration due to the possibility 
and effect of effective diversification (Baumol et al., 1982) and technological 
complementarities (Bain, 1968) acting as signals of firm stability to financiers, or an increase 
in profits (Mahoney, 1992) which would improve a firm’s repayment capabilities. The reasons 
for vertical integration, however, do not concern merely financial problems, but problems 
related to any (e.g., input or output) market transaction. "Inherent in the concept of vertical 
financial ownership is the elimination of contractual or market exchanges and the 
substitution of internal transfers within the boundaries of the firm via internal development 
or merger," (Mahoney, 1992, p. 559). This can be motivated by market failures due to 
incomplete contracting and incentives (transaction costs and property rights issues) 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985; Jones, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) or 
problems of information exchange (information asymmetries and agency costs issues) 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988) between the 
buyer and the seller.12  
According to transaction cost economics, vertical integration encourages specific investments 
and reduces the holdup problem (opportunistic behaviour) (Acemoglu et al., 2009). 
Acemoglu et al. (2009), in his literature review, also states that the prediction of property 
rights theory are not entirely ambiguous regarding the positive effects of vertical integration; 
it suggests that vertical integration can result in a loss of property rights to one party of a past 
contractual relationship and weaken incentives for exerting effort. Aghion et al. (2006) give 
the example that ,ownership, when transferred to the buyer, will enhance the buyer's ex ante 
incentives at the expense of the seller's, as it enhances the buyer's bargaining power ex post at 
the expense of the seller's. This could introduce an issue that could discourage agricultural 
businesses from becoming involved in vertical financial ownership, as their option to gain a 
principal position in the new governance structure is due to sectoral specifics and financial 
constraints (see Chapter 5). Trade credit or other forms of vertical contracting that facilitates 
firm finance could therefore be more suitable for businesses in primary agricultural 
production than in vertical financial ownership.  
Because of the complexity of motives, vertical financial ownership should be discussed as a 
governance structure characterising a firm that can greatly mitigate capital market 
imperfections and facilitate access to finance (Section 3.3) rather than as a practice of only 
mitigating information problems in capital markets (Section 3.2.3). The issue of vertical 
integration is introduced in this section because of the logical connection to trade credit.  
3.2.4 Institutions/regulations and public policies  
Despite the potential of financial intermediation and other market-supporting 
instruments/institutions in mitigating capital market imperfections, capital markets could 
not function effectively without precisely formulated rules in the form of law and regulations, 
their enforceability, and other more general institutions.13 The capital market’s nature of 
contracting about uncertain future affairs and high dependency on information, which 
remains greatly imperfect, calls for institutions that would introduce considerable 
confidence, stability and trust among the market-participating parties. The regulatory 
environment is intended to safeguard depositors and investors, foster competition, respond 
                                                        
12 For further discussion and a review of the theoretical literature on determinants of vertical 
integrations, see, for example, Mahoney (1992), Bolton and Whinston (1993), Aghion et al. (2006) or 
Acemoglu et al. (2009). 
13 This is in line with the views of McMillan (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1998), i.e., that certain 
market-supporting institutions will work only after other institutions have been built. 
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to market imperfections, facilitate effective monetary policy, and achieve other specific social 
goals (Barry and Robison, 2001, p. 553).14   
The two most common sources of finance – debt and equity – and the respective financial 
market institutions require different regulations and general institutions for their effective 
delivery (Kriz et al., 2003). For example, banking institutions are supported by several 
organisations and mechanisms. There is a need for government oversight and deposit 
insurance mechanisms that would inspire confidence in individuals to provide deposits, legal 
regulations that provide for the proper enforcement of contracts, accounting standards that 
would enable accurate determinations of borrower creditworthiness, or risk management 
tools such as property and casualty insurance that would allow borrowers to preserve their 
capital assets from loss. Risk management is as important for equity as it is for debt 
financing. Furthermore, in the case of equity, contract enforcement is important because an 
ownership interest must be specified and protected. Another example of a legal institution 
that is important for equity investing is the protection of limited liability for owners in the 
form of a corporate or limited partnership and the protection of property rights in general. 
Accounting standards are also important for equity financing because those investors who 
provide capital must be able to properly value their share of the business enterprise’s equity 
at any time.15 
Numerous empirical studies compare the regulatory systems of capital markets and general 
legal systems across countries and examine their implication for investment and financing. 
For example, La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) find that in countries where there is a stronger 
general legal system, and particularly more effective protection of investors, more external 
finance is available. Other empirical studies that compare property rights across countries 
consistently show that weaker property rights are correlated with lower aggregate investment 
and slower economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro 1995). Using a sample of 
firms from post-communist countries, Johnson et al. (2002) found that where property 
rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, firms 
do not want to invest from retained earnings. In their analysis of financial institutions and 
markets across nineteen European countries, Aggarwal and Goodell (2010) show that some 
countries are bank-oriented and others rely more on equity financing. The authors analyse 
how this financing orientation relates to legal, cultural, and other national characteristics and 
find that a greater predilection for equity market financing over bank financing is associated 
with higher levels of power distance, concentration in equity markets, or control of 
corruption. A lower use of equity financing is connected to an English legal origin, greater 
uncertainty avoidance, and greater political legitimacy. 
3.3 Firm characteristics  
The previously discussed capital market imperfections are not likely to have an identical 
impact on or be similarly level-constraining for firms of different characteristics. Also, listed 
practices of their mitigation could be differently suitable for various types of firms. In some 
circumstances, some of the capital market constraints can be anticipated to directly originate 
in firm characteristics such as non-optimal investment and financing decisions due to firm-
internal agency costs. Thus, the intention of this chapter is to discuss firm characteristics that 
can be expected to relate to a systemic variability in the capital market conditions and their 
impacts. 
3.3.1 Ownership structure and agency cost of free cash flow 
An investment opportunity of a firm that is fully owned by an entrepreneur is likely resource-
constrained in one point of its growth. This means that the investment opportunity to be 
                                                        
14 For a more detailed discussion of various forms of governmental regulation of financial markets, see 
Barry and Robison (2001).  
15 This paragraph builds on Kriz et al. (2003). 
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realised requires funds that exceed the entrepreneur’s resources. Stiglitz (1974) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that selling equity will dilute the entrepreneur’s property rights 
and incentives. To keep incentives aligned, it will be optimal for the firm to use debt rather 
than equity to finance the growth. However, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend, once the 
firm reaches a high level of leverage, it stimulates risk-taking behaviour on the part of the 
entrepreneur (since the consequences of such actions are to a high degree shared with the 
financier), higher monitoring costs for the lender and higher bankruptcy costs. These risks 
will result in lenders demanding a premium, as well as in progressively worsening terms of 
debt, and will generate incentives for combining debt with equity should the continuous 
growth be realised. The optimal combination of debt and equity is determined by equalising 
the effect of incentive dilution from issuing new equity and risk distortions from issuing debt 
at margin (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) further elaborate on the issue of joint ownership resulting from 
the sale of equity. In their paper on the theory of the firm, they emphasise the role of 
ownership structure, managerial behaviour, and agency costs for firm efficiency, optimal 
investment decisions and finance. The focus of their study is a corporate (equity-financed) 
firm with ownership separated from control, which is delegated to specialised agents, i.e., 
managers. This separation of ownership and control is identified as the origin of firm-
internal agency costs that disturb the optimality of firm decision-making (Berle and Means, 
1932), including decisions on investments and their financing. Similar to the problem related 
to agency costs of the lender-borrower relationship, the origin of the manager-owner 
relationship problem is the conflicting incentive structure between the agent and the 
principal. As agents (managers) often do not have their own wealth at stake, they do not bear 
the full consequences of their actions and their objectives can be differentiated from the 
objectives of the principals (owners).  
Information asymmetries between managers and owners, together with incomplete bonding 
and monitoring due to high costs provide managers with a scope for discretion that allows 
them to follow their own objectives. While stockholders’ objective is to maximise a firm’s 
profit, managers are self-interested individuals maximising their own utility.16 The incurred 
costs and residual losses of this objective mismatch, and the resulting actions, are agency 
costs that are borne by principals17. The more scope given for managerial discretion, the more 
capacity is given to the managers for non-optimal investments and wasting free cash flow on, 
for example, perquisites, which results in higher agency costs of free cash flow. To avoid 
scrutiny of the investment projects with lower returns, managers will prefer to finance 
investments from internally-generated funds (earnings), while owners expecting this 
behaviour will favour debt which exposes management to external scrutiny by banks and 
reduces risk of bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986). Depending on the 
effectiveness of the governance (i.e., accounting standards, disclosure obligations or 
institutions for property rights protection), owners' risk-acceptance versus aversion, which 
can be related to the form of ownership (e.g., external versus employee ownership), or 
owners' returns to active governance related to ownership concentration,18 one form of 
financing will prevail over the other. 
                                                        
16 This can refer to excising managerial laxity, devoting insufficient attention to detail, squandering 
resources in non-business use, and otherwise engaging in self-serving behaviour that is not in line with 
the objectives of principals (Jensen, 1986).  
17 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of “the monitoring expenditures of the 
principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss” (p.308). The first two 
components of agency costs are incurred only in the degree to which they yield reduction in cost 
related to residual loss. The residual loss refers to the loss in firm value due to separation of ownership 
and control.  
18 It is assumed that venture capitalists have more control over management than lenders over 
borrowing firms, and dispose of governance mechanisms and tools that are not available to a lender. 
They also can themselves become managers and thus align conflicting objectives. Small owners, on the 
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In summary, the agency cost of free cash flow can represent firm-internal financial 
constraint. Ownership or governance structures providing managers with a larger scope for 
discretion translate into a higher cost of financial distress for external providers of finance 
and could result in credit rationing. However, since such complex ownership structures are 
mostly chosen considering a trade-off between agency costs and economies of scale or scope, 
higher bankruptcy costs can be expected to result in higher interest rates for provided credit 
rather than credit rationing. Debt can, however, be used by owners as a tool for improving 
firm governance, since debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow available for spending 
at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986).  
3.3.2 Firm size and age 
The problem of agency costs of free cash flow related to corporate governance is often 
irrelevant for small firms. The single or partner ownership of small firms generating zero or 
low firm internal agency costs thus represents one of the few advantages of small firms in the 
context of finance. In the literature, the most frequently discussed problem of small firms is 
information asymmetries (high agency costs) of the firm’s relationship to providers of 
external finance. The information problems in the firm-financier relationship and optimality 
of firm financial decisions are expected to change with firm size and age. Firm size and age 
can be considered jointly as an indication of different points in the firm financial growth 
continuum (cycle) (see Section 4.1.3). The early stages of the financial growth continuum are 
assigned by more severe problems of information asymmetry between the firm and the 
potential providers of finance, which result in greater financial constraints of the younger and 
smaller firms. As previously discussed, these firms do not have access to some practices, thus 
mitigating the effect of the information problem and resulting capital market constraints. For 
example, these firms require time to prove their productive and market potential and require 
time for building relationships with lenders and other providers of finance (Berger and Udell, 
1998). In the same vein, Li and Ferreira, (2011) state that small firms typically have a shorter 
track record of performance and possibly lack the reputation and status to easily access 
financial resources. Berger and Udell (1998) argue that small business’ financial options and 
needs both change as the business grows, gains further experience, and becomes less 
informationally opaque. Therefore, optimal capital structure also varies with firm size and 
age (see Section 4.1.3).  
However, firm size and age are obviously not perfectly correlated, therefore the information 
opacity that is in the firm growth continuum concept mainly related to firm age is relevant to 
only a segment of small firms that are in their early stages of growth. Nevertheless, there are 
small firms participating in the capital market that have retained their small size over a long 
period of time, sometimes over generations. This also applies to many agricultural or rural 
businesses. In these cases, information problems do not result from age but, for example, less 
strict accounting standards or a tendency to partially trade in informal markets.  
A firms’ size, as related to its ability to diversify and confront market volatilities and risks, 
also signals stability and the ability to fulfil contracts, and thus to lower exchange uncertainty 
and transaction costs (Li and Ferreira, 2011). An important characteristic of the 
abovementioned transaction costs related to financing real capital investment is their 
relatively fixed nature, which implies higher unit transaction costs of externally financing 
smaller investments carried out mainly by small firms. As suggested by Jõeveer (2006), small 
firms are also more susceptible to macroeconomic and institutional conditions than are large 
firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
other hand, often have less specialised knowledge, as well as higher costs and lower returns to active 
monitoring. They can therefore be expected to rely on the specialisation and evaluations standards by 
banks for investment financing.  
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The presented characterisation of the firm size-related capital market conditions is not 
exhaustive. The theme of small-firm specifics for finance will, however, recur throughout the 
text in the context of the individual chapters.  
3.3.3 Joint asset ownership and horizontal integration 
A firm has the possibility of internalising the capital market by the shift of its boundaries 
through vertical or horizontal integration (Mathews and Robinson, 2008). For example, 
business-to-business financial contracts such as trade credit can be internalised through a 
business merger. Firm characteristics that result from an integrated governance structure, 
such as economies of scale or scope, or an increase in market power, can improve the firm's 
market standing and its access to external finance, but also introduce specific costs of joint 
asset governance. The effect of vertical integration on firm finance was discussed in section 
3.2.3; this section will thus inquire into horizontal governance structure.   
Horizontal integration refers to the shift of a firm's boundaries (expansion of a firm through 
merger) at the same level in the supply chain, i.e. when the merging firms are active in the 
same product line or market. The sort of horizontal integration examined in this section is 
integration that results in joint asset ownership, where common forms include partnerships, 
cooperatives, and joint ventures (Cai, 2003), also sometimes referred to as business groups 
(e.g., Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005). Joint ownership refers to the shared residual control 
rights of an asset among co-owners (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 
1995). One of the most frequently presented gains of horizontal integration is an increase in 
market power due to the internalisation of the cross-price effect on demand (Colangelo, 
1995). Also, with respect to finance, a cash-poor firm becomes less sensitive to its financial 
constraints upon integration with other firms (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005). Cestone and 
Fumagalli (2005) also show that in business groups (horizontally integrated firms) with 
efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more or less 
profitable units. This would imply a more efficient allocation of financial resources than if 
financial resources are distributed by imperfect (external) capital markets with less 
information on their possible clients. Cai (2003) further shows that another possible 
advantage of joint asset ownership is its role as a "mutual commitment mechanism to 
promote relation-specific investments," (p. 75). However, this assumption is not made by the 
principal agent theory. According to this theory, joint asset ownership is suboptimal, because 
it: i) provides fewer investment incentives for every co-owner than individual ownership in a 
stand-alone firm (Hart, 1995); ii) is burdened by considerable governance costs, i.e. costs of 
collective decision-making (Hansmann, 1996); or iii) free-riding problems in monitoring 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  
In spite of the ambiguous predictions of the presented theories regarding the benefits of 
horizontal integration, with respect to finance, it can be claimed that in cases where joint 
asset ownership structure evolves as an efficient response to product market and asset-
specific conditions, the effect on the firm's access to external finance can be expected to be 
positive. Also, the resource flexibility of integrated firms, when effectively managed within 
the internal capital market, can result in more efficient allocation of financial resources than 
would be possible through an external capital market. Also other forms of horizontal 
governance structures, such as marketing cooperatives that increase firms' market bargaining 
power, or bring about economies of scale or scope that outweigh governance costs and thus 
stabilise the firm financial performance, can be expected to improve a firm’s access to 
finance. 
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL USE | 17 
 
3.3.4 Social capital and reputation 
Other determinants of access to finance that originate in the characteristics of an 
entrepreneur or a firm is social capital and reputation. The main role of social capital19 in the 
context of finance is its effect on the relationship between the principal (financier) and the 
agent (financee) in the financial contractual relationship (Barry and Robison, 2001). Guiso et 
al., (2004) state that, “[S]ince financial contracts are the ultimate trust-intensive contracts, 
social capital should have major effects on the development of financial markets,” (p. 527). If 
the principal has social capital with his agent, for example, through a family relationship or 
friendship, the agent might act in the interest of the principal without the need of a special 
contract to alter incentives or monitoring costs to prevent opportunistic behaviour (Barry 
and Robison, 2001: 532). Social capital in the financier-financee relationship can, therefore, 
be expected to reduce risk from information asymmetries and incomplete contracting which 
could otherwise result in the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as higher 
transaction costs. Because of the transaction costs’ decreasing effect, social capital also 
increases the value of trade between the parties in the financial contract (Barry and Robison, 
2001).  
Given the trust-bracing and transaction cost-reducing effects, social capital can be expected 
to be of a diverse importance for financial relationships in various institutional settings. 
Empirical studies demonstrate that in economies with high information inefficiencies and 
low contract enforcement ability, the financial relationship will be established predominantly 
between social-capital-endowed parties (Guiso et al., 2004; Barry and Robison, 2001). Li and 
Ferreira (2011) also support this relationship with their findings showing that firms use more 
informal sources of financial capital when the institutional environment fails to assure 
efficient capital markets or other institutions.  
Social capital’s effect on access to finance has been further discussed in the context of various 
financial instruments. Two areas in which the role of social capital has been given 
considerable attention are microfinance (see, e.g., Quinones and Seibel, 2000; Ito, 2003) and 
local venture capital (see, e.g., Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Florin et al., 2003). Both refer to 
situations of ‘thin’ capital markets when alternative financial capital provision highly depends 
on the mobilisation of local (community) sources. Findings by Florin et al. (2003), for 
example, imply that “social capital leverages the productivity of a venture's resource base and 
provides the venture with a durable source of competitive advantage,” p. 374. 
The concept of social capital in finance is closely akin to the concept of reputation. The 
reputation-based theory of firm finance introduced by Diamond (1989) is based on the 
argument that the reputation a firm obtains from a history of past debt repayment can 
increase trust between the firm and potential (new) financiers, and thus mitigate agency costs 
related to external financing. Reputation is built through observing the firm's track records, 
examining its long-term relationship with its financiers and assessing its creditworthiness, 
even if the initial financier's information is claimed to be private. This enables firms with a 
good reputation to access cheaper financing from outside investors such as public debt 
holders and equity holders (Diamond, 1989).20  
                                                        
19 There are numerous definitions of social capital. We limit the discussion to the World Bank example, 
which defines social capital as “the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of 
societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals” (World Bank 2000, p 1). 
20 Because the reputation-based theory of finance mainly concerns a reputation’s effect on large 
venture investment decisions, which is less relevant to agriculture, its discussion is kept short. For 
empirical research on the effect of reputation, see, for example, Dollinger et al., (1997), Shane and 
Cable (2002), or Boot et al. (1993). See, for example, Hirshleifer (1993), for the empirical analysis of 
the effect of managerial reputation on corporate investment decisions.  
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3.3.5 Other entrepreneur and firm-related factors  
In connection with social capital, Guiso et al. (2004) find that the effect of social capital is 
more prevalent among less educated people. The authors explain this observation by less 
educated peoples’ greater reliance on trust due to their limited understanding of contracting 
mechanisms. Education as a determinant of access to finance was also identified in other 
studies (see, for example, Cressy, 1996; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Astebro and Bernhard, 
2005). Moreover, entrepreneurs’ race and ethnic ties (Bates, 1997; Smallbone et al., 2003) as 
well as gender (Fay and Williams, 1991; Verheul and Hurik, 2001) were found in empirical 
studies to determine availability of various channels of finance.   
3.4 Sector and production-related factors 
3.4.1 Profitability and growth potential 
Profit in the context of finance represents, firstly, a financial source generated within a firm; 
therefore, the higher the profit, the higher the potential to apply it towards real capital 
investments, as well as to become subject to agency costs of free cash flow. In conditions of 
imperfect capital market due to high information asymmetries, for example, due to the 
complexity of new technologies and investment projects, or due to higher volatility of 
earnings, firms will rely to a higher degree on retained earnings (profits) as the cheapest 
source of finance than they would in a perfect capital market (Myers, 1984). Variability in the 
ability to generate profit among firms would represent firm characteristics; however, there 
can be a substantial variability in earning potentials among sectors, which can be influenced 
by differences in elasticities of demand for the final product, impacting the returns from 
investment and innovation. This condition can then influence the sector’s growth potential 
and its attractiveness for lenders, but particularly for angel or venture capital investors 
(Drabenstott and Meeker, 1999).  
To invest effectively, venture capitalists and private equity intermediaries need to build 
expertise in sectors they invest in. The associated cost of building knowledge distinguishes 
equity investors from lenders, who rely more on the general evaluation criteria of borrowers 
mostly from across sectors. Also, due to their specialised knowledge, equity investors reduce 
information asymmetries, which would otherwise represent risk to lenders. Due to the costs 
of knowledge acquisition and the simultaneous reduction of information asymmetries, equity 
investors invest in business projects that could be generally considered riskier, but expect 
higher returns on their investments (typically over 30%) than the prevailing interest rate. 
Therefore, they screen for investment opportunities mainly in businesses with (expected) fast 
growth potential. Current profitability, together with a business growth potential related to 
product markets and sectors can, therefore, greatly influence access to financial sources, as 
well as capital structure. 
3.4.2 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity represents an issue that is conceptionalised within transaction costs 
economics (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1988). Asset specificity relates to the resale-value 
characteristic of assets. Concretely, asset specificity implies that assets have little value 
outside the firm as they are not easily re-deployable in other business settings. The 
liquidation value of such assets is, therefore, near zero. Another issue related to specific 
assets is the potential of giving rise to the holdup problem,21 which increases financial 
distress (risk of bankruptcy). Specific assets, however, can be a result of the firm’s particular 
needs and are acquired because of several benefits to the performance of the firm. They can, 
                                                        
21 The holdup problem could be demonstrated on, for example, a party that holds a specific knowledge 
(human capital). Such agent could be interested in walking away on the deal or changing the terms of 
the original contract because of the bargaining position earned by the specificity of the knowledge 
(Hart and Moore, 1994). 
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for example, help the firm improve product quality or reduce costs, i.e., generate quasi-rents 
for the firm (Klein et al., 1978), enhance firm value (Teece, 1986), and differentiate its 
products from that of its rivals, i.e. give the firm a competitive advantage in the market 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1991; Balakrishna and Fox, 1993; Ireland et al., 2003). 
It is the limited redeployability outside the firm and the risk of opportunistic (holdup) 
behaviour of the financee which have the chief impact on the firm’s financial decision. These 
characteristics of specific assets can represent factors that can exacerbate market failures, 
since the specific assets i) cannot be fully used as collateral that reduces the risk of 
information asymmetries between the firm and external financiers (increases bankruptcy 
costs), and ii) can provide incentives to holdup behaviour, which represents an additional 
investment risk (increases the risk of bankruptcy).22  
Transaction costs economics addressed the issue of asset specificity-related capital market 
failure; it contributes to financial economics with the argument that the main financial 
objective of the firm is to minimise costs related to financing projects by optimising (post-
contractual) governance costs related to alternative financial instruments. This governance 
(transaction costs) approach to the choice of capital structure is presented in Section 4.1.4.  
3.4.3 Production/sector-specific risk and income volatility 
Risk related to production (e.g., vulnerability to uncontrollable factors such as weather) or 
market-related volatility of earnings is, in the context of finance, chiefly discussed in relation 
to risk and costs of bankruptcy.23 However, the relationship between income volatility and 
the risk of bankruptcy is not straightforward. On the one hand, greater income volatility 
suggests a higher probability of large negative income shocks that lead to ‘non-strategic’ or 
‘excusable’ default. On the other hand, default is likely to be punished by future (possibly) 
permanent exclusion from capital markets, which becomes more costly for borrowers with 
more volatile incomes (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). The model by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
suggests that greater income volatility will result in a tendency of the firm to lower other 
strategic risks and thus decrease the likelihood of strategic default.    
Although strategic default is a firm-level phenomenon, nonstrategic default risk can vary 
among sectors. For example, Scott (1980) argued that industry structure may be an 
important determinant of bankruptcy risk and bankruptcy costs. For instance, firms that 
produce comparable products and apply similar technologies may face a close level of 
uncertainty from product and factor market shocks. The sector-related bankruptcy risk can 
thus be expected to result in systematic differences in capital structure (choice of financial 
channels) between sectors (industries) (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). 
Theoretical as well as empirical literature suggests that the risk related to bankruptcy costs 
reflects in the level of leverage (capital structure). Similar to the relationship between risk 
and bankruptcy costs, the relationship between the level of risk and the choice of financial 
sources is, however, ambiguous. One string of literature suggests that increasing risk leads to 
a reduction in debt financing. The rationale behind this is as follows: the higher volatility of 
earnings and other industry-related risk operating through bankruptcy costs are differently 
perceived between lenders (bondholder) and equity-holders (shareholders). Indeed, 
shareholders are mainly concerned with the upper portion of the probability distribution of 
possible performance outcomes, i.e. outcomes above the amount required for repaying debt. 
Bondholders, on the other hand, are concerned with only the lower end of the probability 
distribution of outcomes, because they receive only the interest portion specified in the debt 
                                                        
22 The potential for holdup behaviour can result in financial constraint since potential financiers may 
foresee this problem and therefore be unwilling to provide adequate resources to such firms. This 
would imply that some profitable investment opportunities will not be financed (Hart and Moore, 
1994). Hart (1995) suggests that the holdup problem could be solved by giving the control rights of the 
firm to the agent or entity owning the specific resource. 
23 Alternative terms used for bankruptcy costs are costs of financial distress or default. 
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contract and none of the earnings above this payment. Riskier projects, therefore, reduce the 
expected payoffs to bondholders (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). These different interests in 
the distribution of earnings between lenders and shareholders not only result in an agency 
problem (moral hazard) and a higher price of debt (higher risk premium), but also in higher 
risk of liquidation of highly leveraged businesses, since bondholders are more prone to acting 
on a temporary decrease in earnings with premature bankruptcy and liquidation (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). This suggests that a “firm’s optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the 
volatility of earnings” (Titman and Wessels, 1988: 6).  
Another area of literature pointing to an adverse relationship between risk and leverage 
suggests that it is not only an issue of optimality that decreases the share of debt financing 
with increasing risk, it is a question of debt financing becoming more constrained (Barry and 
Robison, 2001; Cato and Kapur, 2006).  
On the other hand, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; 
Jensen, 1986), which deals with firm-internal agency costs related to the separation of 
ownership and control, implies that increasing risk could increase the tendency towards debt 
financing. In a corporate firm setting, income volatility and related risk increases the agency 
costs of mismanagement under discretion and free cash flow. This provides principals with 
the incentive to increase control of, or discipline managers through, preferring to debt 
finance (when compared to internal funding) investment projects. However, as mentioned 
above, this increases the risk of bank-induced premature bankruptcy. Accounting for 
managers likely not wanting to lose their employment, principals weigh the agency costs and 
costs of debt under higher income volatility and higher risk-premium charged by banks. 
The general implication of the discussion as presented is that higher income volatility and 
other risks generate higher financing costs or external-finance rationing; therefore, measures 
decreasing risk are of high importance to efficient and rationally-behaving firms. Among 
these is the so-called coinsurance effect of diversification, which may lead to the reduction of 
total risk, paving the way for increased debt (Kim and McConnell, 1977). Another important 
tool is applying risk management measures (Barry and Robison, 2001). 
3.4.4 Other sector and production-related factors  
Among other characteristics of a production process or sectors that are discussed in the 
literature in relation to finance are capital intensity, share of variable costs, length of 
production cycle, capital mobility or geographic location. This section provides just a few 
illustrations.  
Capital intensity has been analysed in relation to higher dependency and demand for external 
financing and as a factor of higher collateral value of assets. In this context, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) argue that “firms with assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to 
issue more debt,” which can be sold to investors in a later stage. This reduces costs of directly 
issuing shares, because debt represents more stable security than a share which would be 
offered by managers holding discretion over the true value of equity. Greater capital intensity 
as related to higher collateral value of assets could thus represent an advantage in the capital 
market. The high need of capital investments can, on the other hand, represent a problem for 
capital-intensive industries in constrained capital markets. For example, Acemoglu et al. 
(2009), find that in an environment assigned by greater costs of financial contracting, 
capital-intensive industries are likely to surge more intensely for possibilities of mitigating 
these costs, which leads them to be more vertically integrated.  
Furthermore, Bierlen et al. (1998) show that firms in a sector with inventories with high 
variable costs and relatively short production cycles are highly susceptible to market shocks. 
Also, here they reacted to this problem through more frequent vertical integration and the 
formation of large production firms that facilitate access to external finance.  
Barry and Ellinger (1997) suggest that the geographic location of a firm can not only 
determine its (costs of) access to a capital market, but also its reliance on geography-specific 
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capital markets. Although this is mainly a firm-related issue, it can also be a sectoral 
characteristic, such as in the case of agriculture. Barry and Ellinger (1997) find rural financial 
markets to be less competitive than their urban counterparts, and rural and agricultural 
businesses thus to be more finance constrained and to rely more on relationship lending.  
4. Theories of capital structure choice  
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory of corporate finance suggests that financing decisions 
may be ‘irrelevant’ for firm strategy. Their theorem, also known as the capital structure 
irrelevance principle, implies that demand for financial capital would be fully determined by 
demand for investment (physical capital), reflecting the firm's ability of generating positive 
present values of investment. However, later literature, which started with Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) paper, advocates that choice of financial channels may differentially affect 
firm value largely because of capital market imperfections. The abovementioned capital 
market imperfections and factors of their attenuation, therefore, not only have an impact on 
the level of the used and available financial capital (finance rationing), but very importantly 
on the costs of and hence the choice of the source of finance – debt, equity, alternative 
sources of finance, or their combination. The theories of firm capital structure thus deal with 
the question of how to attenuate the costs of financing by optimising the firms' capital 
structure (firm leverage) considering various firm or sectoral characteristics. The first two 
sections of this chapter will deal with capital structure choice in imperfect capital markets 
with perfect and imperfect competition, respectively. The third section reviews theories of the 
relationship between debt and leasing financing. 
4.1 Theories of capital structure choice in imperfect capital markets 
with perfect competition 
A wide range of theories recognise the existence of capital market imperfections while at the 
same time considering financial markets (supply side) to be perfectly competitive. These 
theories rationalise the optimal choice of capital structure that minimises financial costs as a 
result of taxes, asymmetric information, conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders, etc. Since the financial markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, these 
costs are passed back to the firm in the form of higher cost of capital, thus providing 
incentives to choose an optimal capital structure (Guriev and Kvasov, 2009, p. 131). This 
section focuses on four main theories of capital structure choice – the trade-off theory, the 
pecking order theory, the agency theory approach and the transaction costs economics 
approach to capital structure choice.24 Both theories have been developed for the context of 
corporate finance and hence have only a partial relevance to small- or medium-sized 
enterprise finance. Since these are particularly important in the context of agriculture and 
rural undertakings, this section also includes the theory of firms’ growth continuum focused 
on small firm finance. 
4.1.1 The trade-off theory of capital structure  
The trade-off theory considers a fusion of factors that jointly determine the firm optimal 
capital structure. Holding the firm's assets and investment plans constant, a firm optimises 
its debt ratio by considering the trade-off between the costs and benefits of borrowing 
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1984). In the core of the theory are tax advantages of 
borrowing (interest tax shields) that are balanced against the costs of financial distress 
(Myers, 2003). Costs of financial distress encompass costs of bankruptcy or financial 
                                                        
24 The list of theoretical approaches is not exhaustive. For other theoretical models such as the market 
timing model (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), managerial inertia model (Welch, 2004), or the theory of 
capital structure adjustment speed (Flannery and Hankins, 2007), see the original literature.  
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embarrassment.25 The firm is assumed to substitute debt for equity, or vice versa, until the 
value of the firm is maximised, i.e., the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-value ratio, 
which the firm gradually moves towards. Myers (1984, p. 577) depicted this relation as 
presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. The trade-off theory of capital structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Myers (1984, p. 577). 
The costs of financial distress are clearly endogenous. Factors of financial distress discussed 
in the literature on trade-off theory include firm profitability, earnings volatility, and asset 
specificity. In the context of agriculture, it would be incorrect to disregard other production 
risks such as weather shocks. Expected bankruptcy costs, among other costs of financial 
distress, arise when firm profitability declines (earnings volatility and other risks increase); 
the thread of these costs pushes these firms toward lower leverage targets (Fama and French, 
2002). Myers (1984, p. 581) summarises the effect of these factors as follows: 
1. Other things being equal, risky26 firms ought to borrow less. The higher the variance 
rate of the market value of the firm's assets, the greater the probability of default on any 
given package of debt claims. Less risky firms ought to be able to borrow more before 
the expected costs of financial distress offset the tax advantages of borrowing.  
2. The expected cost of financial distress depends not just on the probability of trouble, 
but the value lost if trouble comes. Specialised, intangible assets or growth 
opportunities are more likely to lose value in the case of bankruptcy. Firms holding 
tangible assets-in-place on active second-hand markets will borrow more than firms 
holding specialised, intangible assets or valuable growth opportunities. 
The principle behind the tax benefits of borrowing and their effect on firm leverage was, 
among others, depicted in a model by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). Their model represents 
a compromise model between other two models on taxes and debt; one by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) and the other by Miller (1977).27 Also, contrary to a model by Miller and 
Scholes (1978), which also deals with taxes’ effect on optimal capital structure, DeAngelo and 
                                                        
25 Costs of financial distress include the legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy, as well as the 
subtler agency, moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs, which can erode firm value even if 
formal default is avoided; they thus represent costs that are caused by threatened or actual default 
(Myers, 1984, pp. 580-581). 
26 "Risk" is defined as the variance rate of the market value of the firm's assets. 
27 See original papers for more on these models. 
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Masulis’s (1980) model allows the marginal benefit of the corporate tax deduction of interest 
to vary with leverage, and thus produce an interior optimum for leverage. The main 
argument behind their model of taxation effect on firm financing is the asymmetric taxation 
of profit and loses – the government (typically) does not subsidise losses as heavily as it taxes 
profits. Therefore, more profitable firms expect higher taxation than do less profitable firms, 
and thus also a higher payoff from interest tax shields. In the same direction of the effect of 
financial distress, the tax deductibility of corporate interest payment pushes more profitable 
firms (as well as firms with less volatile earnings) toward more borrowing.28 
4.1.2 Pecking order theory of capital structure  
The pecking order theory of finance (Donaldson, 1981; Myers, 1984) postulates that firms are 
prone to sequence financing: that is, firms finance new investment first with retained 
earnings, then with low-risk debts, then with higher risk debt, and finally, under duress, with 
equity. Myers (1984) attributes this order to costs of asymmetric information and costs of 
financial distress. The asymmetric information costs of financing, which pecking order 
behaviour results from, include the transaction costs associated with new share (stock) issues 
and the costs that arise because of management's superior information about the firm's 
prospects and the value of its risky securities.29 While in the pecking order theory, financing 
costs overwhelm the benefit of corporate taxation of interest, as well as costs of financial 
distress, in the trade-off theory, they can shift the target leverage while holding the trade-off 
principle valid (Fama and French, 2002). 
In his paper "The capital structure puzzle", Myers (1984) gave the generally-accepted pecking 
order story a theoretical foundation that fit with the theory of modern finance. He based the 
theory on a rationale of the comparative cost of various financial schemes. Until then, the 
economic reasoning behind the higher cost of equity was missing30; Myers found it in the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) model of corporate financing and investment decision under 
information asymmetry. The model is based on the assumption that managers have special 
information that impacts their financing choices and predicts which choices will be 
interpreted by investors as good or bad news. Investors are aware of managers’ information 
advantages and possible risky investment behaviour. They expect that in situations, when a 
firm announces new stock issues, the firm's securities are likely overpriced31. This results in 
investors' tendency to discount the firm's new and existing securities. Managers anticipating 
these securities' discounts may forego profitable investments if these securities are too risky 
and they are the only possible method of financing the project. In avoiding the information 
distortion problems of issuing securities (cost of asymmetric information)32, managers prefer 
to finance projects with retained earnings and low-risk debt – the former involve no 
asymmetric information problems, and, for the latter, this problem is negligible.33 
Investment projects are financed by higher-risk securities only under duress, e.g., if debt is 
excessively costly (e.g., in case of imperfect competition on financial markets, see, e.g., Guriev 
and Kvasov, 2009). 
                                                        
28 This paragraph is built on a literature review by (Fama and French, 2002).  
29 Fama and French (2002) associate also adjustment costs in capital stock to what Myers (1984) calls 
the costs of financing (incl. costs of asymmetric information), when rationalising his pecking order 
theory of capital structure choice. 
30 Empirical observations did not seem to confirm that issue costs in themselves are large enough to 
surpass the costs and benefits of leverage stressed by the trade-off theory (Fama and French, 2002). 
31 Safest possible securities are those whose future value changes least when the manager's inside 
information is revealed to the market (Myers, 1984, p. 584).   
32 Firms do not want to run the risk of falling into the dilemma of either passing by positive net present 
value project or issuing stock at a price they think is too low (Myers, 1984). 
33 It is important to emphasise that this theory refers to corporate firms, mostly publically traded, of 
which reporting and disclosure obligations reduce information asymmetries between the firm and the 
debt financiers. 
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Myers (1984) suggests that the costs of issuing risky debt or equity dominate over the factors 
that determine the optimal leverage in the trade-off model, and argues that in a pecking 
order world, firms do not have leverage targets. Myers (1984) offers both a simple and 
complex model of the pecking order effect on firm leverage. In the simple pecking order 
scenario, debt level depends on the ratio of the (positive net-present-value) investment 
outlays and retained earnings (profitability). Debt usually grows when investment exceeds 
retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings. Therefore, 
holding investment fixed, leverage is lower for more profitable firms. In the more complex 
model, firms are concerned with future as well as current financing costs and investment 
opportunities. It is possible that firms with large expected investments maintain low-risk 
debt capacity to avoid either foregoing future investments or financing them with new risky 
securities.34 Controlling for other factors, it is thus possible that firms with larger expected 
investments choose to invest to a higher degree in correspondence with their current retained 
savings capacity, and thus have less current leverage (Fama and French, 2002). 
4.1.3 Agency theory approach to capital structure choice 
The agency theory of capital structure choice, developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), was 
explicated in Section 3.3.1 in the context of ownership structure and its relation to finance. It 
has been shown that in corporate firms with separated ownership and control (management), 
retained earnings representing free cash flow can, under managerial discretion, be used sub-
optimally because of the misalignment of interests (objectives) between the managers and 
owners. Managers are interested in employment and high earnings plus other consumables 
and perquisites; they may have incentives to pursue strategies of firm size growth that signal 
their good performance to the owners, even if it requires non-profitable investments and 
likely results in losses to the owners (Baker et al., 1988; Donaldson, 1984). 
These residual losses, or agency costs, that stem from managers’ sub-optimal behaviour give 
rise to the need of aligning the agents’ (managers’) incentive structure with that of the 
principals. Agency theory finds the potential for the ex ante incentive alignments in the right 
choice of financial instrument. Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) argue that it is 
the use of debt that can induce managers to behave in a manner more aligned with the 
owners’ interests. Contrary to the pecking order theory, the agency theory thus suggests that, 
in corporate firm settings, it is more optimal to finance investment projects through debt 
than from retained earnings. The role of debt lies in the additional screening of the 
investment project by external financiers, disciplining managers in using the available 
financial resources to secure regular debt interest payments and in decreasing the volume of 
free cash flow by redistributing it to investors (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, debt is considered 
as a financial instrument increasing the efficiency of firm financial resource use due to its 
agency costs-mitigating effect. 
4.1.4 Transaction costs economics approach to capital structure choice 
The transaction costs economics approach embodies a complementary approach to the 
agency approach to corporate finance.35 Similar to agency theory, transaction costs 
economics considers managerial discretion and incomplete contracting, and adopts an 
efficient contracting orientation. Compared to agency theory, in which the individual agent is 
the elementary unit of analysis, in transaction costs economics, the basic unit of analysis is 
the transaction. Based on Williamson (1988), the most important aspect to which 
transactions differ is asset specificity. However, the organisational impact of this asset 
                                                        
34 The firm may plan to cover part of their normal investment outlays with new borrowing, but tries to 
keep this debt safe (close to default-risk free). The reasons for this restraint are preventing the possible 
material costs of financial distress and maintaining a reserve borrowing power so it can use debt in the 
future if needed (Myers, 1984, p. 589).  
35 In some more detailed issues, these theories do, however, derive contradictory predictions (see, for 
example, Kochhar, 1996).   
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characteristic is evident only in an incomplete contracting context. This joining of incomplete 
contracting with asset specificity provides the ramification for corporate finance. 
In his transaction costs economic approach to corporate finance, Williamson (1988) treats 
debt and equity as alternative post-contractual governance structures rather than alternative 
financial instruments. This represents one of the main differences between the transaction 
cost and the agency approaches to capital structure decision. Transaction costs economics 
thus emphasises ex post contracting costs; of these, maladaptation costs which are incurred 
when transactions drift out of alignment (with the original contract) are the most important 
component (Williamson, 1985, 1988). “Reducing these costs through judicious choice of 
governance structure [market, hierarchy, or hybrid], rather than merely realigning incentives 
and pricing them out, is the distinctive transaction costs economic orientation,” (Williamson, 
1988, p. 572). 
The transaction costs approach states that whether a project should be financed by debt or 
equity depends principally on the characteristics of the assets and characteristics of debt and 
equity as alternative governance structures. Debt is perceived as a market-like governance 
structure which operates mainly based on rules (regular interest payments, liquidity and debt 
maturity condition, pre-emptive lender’s claims against assets in the case of bankruptcy). Of 
particular interest to TCE is the value of pre-emptive claims, which decreases with asset 
specificity, as the liquidity value of such assets is low. This reflects adversely in the terms of 
debt financing. In such a situation, a firm can consider equity financing, which would be in 
conditions of the same degree of asset specificity a more expensive financial instrument. 
However, this embodies a different set of governance characteristics which allow for much 
greater discretion; these include the equity holder’s residual claimant status to the firm or 
power to control and replace management (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). Due to the control 
characteristics, equity is considered to be a more intrusive governance structure which has 
better assurance properties and is more forgiving than debt (Williamson, 1988). Despite 
equity finance being related to higher setup costs due to its greater complexity of governance, 
the costs of debt financing are assumed to rise more rapidly with an increasing degree of 
asset specificity than costs of equity financing. Therefore, debt is reasoned by the transaction 
cost economic approach to be used for financing less specific (redeployable) assets, while 
more specific (non-redeployable) assets should be expected to be financed by equity.  
In comparison to the pecking order theory, TCE does not offer a justification of the 
preference of using retained earnings to debt. On the other hand, the pecking order theory 
does not make any reference to asset specificity, but both theories conclude that “equity is the 
financial instrument of last resort” (Williamson, 1988, p. 585); therefore, the presented 
theories have complementary contributions.  
4.1.5 Firm growth continuum and capital structure choice 
This section presents theories of finance optimisation at various stages of the firms’ growth 
continuum (cycle). It deals with the question of what type of financing options growing firms 
have available, and what can be expected to determine their choice of capital structure. 
Particular focus will be placed on the micro-foundations of small business finance, which will 
be representative for a large share of agricultural businesses.  
As Berger and Udell (1998) suggest, optimal capital structure varies with firm size and age, 
which are indicative of different points in the financial growth continuum. These authors 
argue that small business financial needs and options change as the business gains further 
experience, and becomes less informationally opaque. The changing informational 
opaqueness related to costs of information asymmetry between the firm and potential 
providers of finance is the main principle behind the changing financing options and 
changing optimality of the firms' choice of financial sources during the growth continuum. 
Figure 2 aims to provide a general idea of what type of funding becomes important at various 
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stages during the firms' growth.36 The stages on the growth continuum at which different 
financial sources are demonstrated to start and finish are not proposed to be unique or fixed.  
Figure 2. Firm continuum and sources of finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Berger and Udell’s (1998, p. 623) adaptation of Carey et al. (1993, p. 41). 
                                                        
36 Berger and Udell (1998, p. 622) state that, "the notion that firms evolve through a financial growth 
continuum is well established in the literature as a descriptive concept," not as a formally-derived 
concept. The authors emphasize that the growth cycle paradigm is intended to provide a general idea 
of the changing availability and importance of various sources of finance, but it is not intended to fit all 
small businesses. One of the reasons is that firm size, age, and information availability are obviously 
not perfectly correlated. 
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In Figure 2, smaller, younger and more opaque firms are to be found on the left end of the 
firm continuum.37 It is a general perception that at its very early development stage, a firm is 
heavily dependent on initial insider and angel finance. The initial insider finance38 are funds 
provided by the start-up team, family, and friends prior to and at the time of the firm's set-
up, when the entrepreneur is still developing the product or business concept/plan39, and 
when the firm's assets are mostly intangible. In its early operational stage, a firm could have 
further access to trade credit, and in some cases also short-term commercial (personal) loans. 
The theoretical idea behind the spinosity in obtaining other external finance, especially its 
intermediated form, finds its grounds in the lack of transparency about the new firm, as start-
up firms are argued to be the most informationally opaque (Sahlman, 1990).40  
In the next stage of the firms’ growth continuum, i.e. as firms grow and after their products 
have been successfully test-marketed, they are expected to gain access to intermediated 
equity finance (venture capital) and debt finance (banks, finance companies, etc.). Venture 
capital is typically obtained to finance full-scale marketing and production; however, it may 
also be used to finance product development if its costs are substantial and the new product 
has high prospects to be successfully marketed. Berger and Udell (1998) also state that banks 
or other commercial finance institutions would traditionally not lend to small businesses 
until their balance sheets reflect substantial tangible business assets that might be pledged as 
collateral, for example accounts receivable, inventory, and equipment. Eventually, if the firms 
succeed and remain in existence, and continue to grow (accumulate sufficient equity), they 
may gain access to public equity and public debt markets. 
The sequencing of financial sources available to firms over their growth cycle can be 
examined by means of various theories. Berger and Udell (1998) mainly refer to the modern 
information-based theory of security design and the pecking order theory, but trade-off 
theory arguments are also well applicable in the context of the firm’s growth continuum. The 
first, information-based theory, has its foundation in the consideration of costs of state 
verification or monitoring41 (Townsend, 1979; Diamond, 1991), while the pecking order 
theory highlights the information asymmetry between firms and funding providers, thus 
leading to adverse selection (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Both theories suggest 
that after firms exhaust their insider finance, the next optimal financing is represented by 
debt. As shown in Figure 4.2, these debt contracts could include trade credit and financial 
institutions loans, i.e., commercial bank loans and finance company loans. However, if the 
required external finance amount is relatively large compared to the size of insiders' equity 
and other personal collateral or other wealth possibly claimed as guarantees, the moral 
hazard problem is likely to occur. This problem increases the default risk (moral hazard) to 
external creditors who are then less willing to make their funds available. Therefore, the 
moral hazard problem can make debt contracts rather problematic. Also, from the side of the 
firm and in line with the trade-off theory, the low equity (high leverage after acquiring debt) 
                                                        
37 The next two paragraphs refer mainly to the description of the firm's size/age/information 
continuum and financial sources by Berger and Udell (1998: 622-624). 
38 Insider finance depends clearly on the financial resources of the entrepreneur. Thus, changes in 
demographics and wealth distribution may affect new firm formation (Rosen, 1998).  
39 The business plan is often used as a sales document to attract angels finance.  
40 However, empirical analyses of the financial growth cycle by Fluck et al. (1998) and Berger and 
Udell (1998) suggest that perhaps informational opacity does not make it quite so difficult for young 
firms to obtain external finance, particularly debt from financial institutions, as is implied by the 
perceived wisdom of the financial growth cycle. The reason is the private wealth and property of the 
“new” entrepreneur used as collateral when applying for external debt. 
41 In this theory "an optimal contract depends on the principal’s ability to monitor the state of nature, 
the action taken by the agent, and the output of the consumption good” (Townsend, 1979, p. 267), i.e. 
the principal’s ability to reduce information asymmetries and related risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Importantly, the monitoring ability of principles is considered by this theory variable 
(endogenous) and monitoring is associated with costs. 
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represents high financial distress (risk of bankruptcy) that could act against the firm’s 
decision to acquire debt (and would likely outweigh the benefits of tax deductibility of 
interest rate on debt). In these conditions of low equity (collateral), i.e., acute risk related to 
moral hazard (for a lender) and high financial distress (for the firm), external equity finance, 
specifically angel and venture capital, becomes particularly important.  
This reverse pecking order, in which angel finance and/or venture capital is often obtained 
before significant amounts of external debt finance, can be expected in the case of firms with 
high-risk new ventures (characteristic increasing moral hazard) that possess high-growth 
potential. This potential has to be identified by the potential venture investors. Garmaise 
(2001) assumes this order of firm financing if venture capitalists have superior information 
to entrepreneurs (or financial institutions).42 The advantage of venture capitalists providing 
equity compared to creditors is their internal involvement in the company (e.g., through 
membership on the supervisory board) and the possibility of replacing managers; venture 
capitalists thus have lower overall costs of monitoring than creditors. Also, venture capitalists 
do not deal with moral hazard as such, but rather the agency costs of the principal-agent 
(venture capitalist-entrepreneur) relationship. These can be mitigated in numerous ways, 
such as structuring financial contracts, pre-investment screening, and post-investment 
monitoring and advising (see Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001).  
The literature also offers other arguments that contribute to the explanation of the choice 
between external equity and external debt. For example, entrepreneurs may choose external 
debt in order to keep ownership and control of their firms, or they may choose external 
equity to help share risk with less risk-averse investors. This implies that the entrepreneur’s 
financing decision is not only a result of rationally considering the costs of financing and 
returns and risks related to investment projects, but it also reflects her/his strategy regarding 
ownership and risk-aversion (Berger and Udell, 1998). The traditional structure of 
agricultural businesses characterised by the dominant position of family farms would then 
imply that the former determinant, i.e., retaining ownership and control over the farm, might 
be of particular importance for agricultural entrepreneurs (which does not need to be the 
case for rural entrepreneurs in general). 
4.2 Determinants of capital structure choice in imperfect capital 
markets with imperfect competition 
The previously discussed theories of the effect of financial market imperfections referred to 
imperfections on the side of the firm. However, a number of studies acknowledge and analyse 
the capital structure effect of imperfections on the side of financial capital supply. Among the 
listed reasons for believing that financial markets are not perfectly competitive are financial 
services' requirement of reputational capital, for example, or barriers of entry from 
information accumulation and processing43 (Dell Ariccia et al., 1999). In this context, Griffith 
(2005) argues that some financial intermediaries (underwriters) exercise market power and 
use it for implicit price discrimination, which brings them benefits. Guriev and Kvasov 
(2009) provide statistics on how a few "global, universal commercial and investment banks 
of new generation" command a substantial share in virtually all financial markets (represent 
oligopoly), including debt and equity issues, which allows them to strategically influence their 
relative prices and thus the demand for one or the other financial source. This leads to 
positive rents for the intermediaries. Guriev and Kvasov (2009) develop a model showing 
that firm equilibrium capital structure is different in competitive and concentrated markets. 
                                                        
42 Garmaise (2001) argues that while it seems plausible to argue that entrepreneurs have a superior 
informational advantage over certain aspects of their project, such as the feasibility of their projects' 
technology, it may be reasonable to assume that venture capitalists have superior information over a 
project's marketability and its operational implementation. 
43 Potential entrant banks will face an adverse-selection problem stemming from their inability to 
distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank (Dell 
Ariccia et al., 1999). 
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Their model suggests that in line with the pecking order theory, debt crowds out equity as 
long as financial markets are sufficiently competitive. However, as markets become more 
concentrated, equity financing does emerge in equilibrium. Implications of Guriev and 
Kvasov's (2009) model are such that a higher concentration of financial market power, 
ceteris paribus, both across countries and over time, should result in a higher reliance on 
equity finance. Furthermore, multiple stable equilibria may emerge; in each equilibrium, 
stock prices are based on fundamentals, and investors buy debt and equity based on their 
rational beliefs. Therefore, either equilibrium is not a temporary bubble but is sustainable in 
the long run.   
Other papers assuming imperfect competition on financial markets are, for example, papers 
by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), who consider an extreme-case monopolistic creditor. 
Their model predicts that since a monopolistic creditor is able to form long-term ties and 
internalise the debtor’s benefits from investment, he/she performs better than the 
competitive market. Since the more empirically-supported case of financial market oligopoly 
(compared to monopoly) affects mainly public financial markets, which are only rarely 
accessible to agricultural businesses, these theories will not be elaborated on in further detail. 
4.3 Determinants of the lease- or-buy decision 
There exists a fundamental premise that leasing as a financial instrument is a result and 
manifestation of capital market imperfections. Ben-Yosef (1988), for example, views the 
"lease or buy" decision as a part of the firm internalisation and integration of market 
inefficiencies and transaction costs. He argues that, in practice, lease contracts are frequently 
customised, which suggests that leasing does not necessarily emerge in response to tax 
incentives. Among others, Myers et al. (1976) and Schallheim (1994), on the other hand, 
argue that financial leases are largely tax-driven. The rationale behind this is the tax 
advantage, which results from the time value of money, especially in periods of high inflation 
and high nominal interest rates. The time value of money refers to a net gain, which occurs 
when the lessor’s tax rate is higher than the lessee’s, and the lessor’s interest and depreciation 
tax shields are realised earlier than the taxes paid on the lease payments.   
Another string of literature deals with the relationship between leasing and debt financing. A 
controversy exists in theoretical and empirical literature about whether leasing and debt 
financing are substitutes or complimentary sources of finance. Prevailing theories in finance, 
including theories rationalising leasing based on tax position differences between the lessee 
and the lessor, suggest that leases and debt are substitutes; i.e., an increase in the use of lease 
financing should lead to a decrease in the level of debt financing (Myers et al. 1976; Scott, 
1977; Brealey and Young, 1980; Leeth and Scott, 1989). The theoretical explanation of the 
trade-off relationship between lease and debt offered by Krishnan and Moyer (1994) is built 
on the argument that there is a trade-off between bankruptcy costs and transaction costs. 
First, Scott (1977) and Leeth and Scott (1989) argued that leases have lower expected 
bankruptcy costs for the lessor than secured debt has for the lender.44 Because the expected 
bankruptcy costs must be compensated for by the lessee or borrower, a firm with a higher 
anticipated bankruptcy cost will find lease financing available at a lower cost than debt 
financing. On the other hand, Krishnan and Moyer (1994) identify the leases as more 
complex contracts than those required for assets that are owned and financed with debt. They 
argue that in addition to the transaction costs of establishing a lease contract, there are 
potentially also other transaction costs over the life of the lease. Therefore, financial leases 
can be expected to be associated with higher transaction costs than borrowing. A 
combination of these factors makes leasing a preferred financing alternative for firms with a 
higher potential for financial distress. However, when a firm has a low probability of 
                                                        
44 This relates to the fact that recovery in the case of a defaulted lease for a firm in bankruptcy to a 
lessor is superior to recoveries from a defaulted loan, which are limited to the outstanding balance due, 
plus accruals and unpaid interest (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994). 
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bankruptcy, the effect of transaction costs can be expected to dominate the lease-borrow 
decision.  
Numerous empirical studies provide supportive evidence of leases and debt being substitutes 
(e.g., Marston and Harris, 1988; Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Yan, 2006). Some studies, 
however, find contradictory results suggesting a complementary relationship between these 
two alternatives of financing (see, e.g., Ang and Peterson, 1984; Bowman, 1980). These 
findings are consistent with the tax arbitrage theory introduced by Lewis and Schallheim 
(1992), which suggests that leases and debt can be complimentary since a lessee can sell its 
tax shields to a lessor through leases. The excess tax deductions can motivate the lessee firm 
to increase the proportion of debt in its capital structure relative to an otherwise identical 
firm that does not use leasing. Thus, debt and leases can be complements. Also, a competitive 
lessor can diversify financial sources to reduce risk. This could be also supported by the study 
by Marston and Harris (1988), which shows that firms employing lease financing typically 
use higher levels of debt compared to firms that do not use lease financing. However, using 
the same data, the authors found that changes in the debt and the lease ratios for individual 
firms over time are inversely related, which confirms that debt and lease financing are 
actually substitutes.  
5. Financial characteristics of agricultural and rural businesses 
Agriculture and entrepreneurship in rural areas are undertakings characterised by unique 
traits that need to be accounted for when utilising modern finance theory to explain their 
demand for and access to finance. Characteristics such as the relatively small-size and non-
corporate structure of a majority of farm and rural businesses preclude numerous finance 
instruments and access to funding sources such as some issuances, or trading and risk 
pricing of equity capital shares in public markets45 (e.g., Barry and Robison, 2001; Kriz et al., 
2000). This constrained access to external (public) equity results in the farm and rural 
business developing greater dependence on debt financing and placing a greater emphasis on 
credit market facilitating instruments such as reputation, information exchanges or 
specialisation in agricultural finance intermediation (Barry and Robison, 2001).  
Yet there are farms which have followed a fast growth strategy; they have merged or grown to 
a size that allowed them to be listed and their shares to be traded on the stock exchange. In 
these cases, access to land has often represented an important precondition of growth.46 
However, to the author’s knowledge, no research has been done on the portfolio in which 
these agricultural companies identified their growth potentials, or how they achieved the 
critical size necessary for issuing stock – if they were backed by venture capitalists – or 
sufficient private wealth of the start-up owners or wealth accumulated from entrepreneurial 
activities in other sectors. An intuitive characteristic of these companies is their openness to 
disclosure, external control and joint ownership.  
In general, farms can be characterised as highly capital-intensive relative to their levels of 
sales and cash flow and as businesses with agriculture-specific (inflexible) and weakly 
diversified assets. Agricultural production is further characterised by a significant lag 
between the purchase of inputs and the sale of outputs (long production cycle) and its 
vulnerability to natural conditions. Although a discussion of the financial specifics of 
agricultural and rural businesses would require distinguishing between small scale individual 
                                                        
45 The preclusion of traded equity finance applies even for larger scale corporate farms operating 
mainly in New Member States (NMS) of the European Union (EU) due to the lack of necessary equity-
market-supporting institutions. 
46 This would help explain why these farms of often Western ownership operate predominantly on land 
in NMSs or former East Germany, where land ties are weaker due to the collectivisation past, and 
where land rental is mainly based on fixed-term contracts. 
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or family farms/rural firms and large-scale corporate (and cooperative47) farms/rural firms, 
due to the predominance of small scale agricultural and rural businesses, this chapter 
develops financial conditions mainly for small or medium-sized businesses, but also covers 
many size-independent financial characteristics of agricultural sector.     
5.1 Effect of small business size 
Agricultural and rural businesses represent mostly individually-or family-owned businesses, 
are companies with shares that are rarely if ever traded, or have stocks that are not actively 
traded on major stock exchanges. Since a significant share of agricultural and rural 
businesses are small businesses, Section 4.1.5, which was devoted to theoretical discussion on 
small business’ access to financial sources, applies here. The theory of the financial growth 
continuum suggests that small business’ financial needs and options change as the business 
grows, gains further experience, and becomes more transparent for potential financiers (e.g. 
through observing successful marketing of their products). By lowering the cost of 
information asymmetry, firms gain access to external finance – either debt or private 
equity48. The higher cost of information asymmetries related to a small firm size, including 
the cost of state verification, monitoring or possibility of adverse selection, implies that these 
firms will first exhaust their insider finance. As the pecking order theory suggests, the next 
financing option is debt. Equity finance is considered as a more costly financing option due to 
investors’ tendency to discount the value of new securities before the investment. This 
discounting can be expected to be higher in the case of agriculture due to higher risk of this 
type of security49 related to the riskier nature of the agricultural undertaking related to 
production dependency on weather conditions, price volatility, or sensitivity of finance to 
changing sectoral policy. Equity financing also brings about the costs of more rigid 
information collection and reporting to private equity holders (partners, shareholders) and 
costs of joint ownership governance.      
Because of the particularly high cost of equity for small agricultural and rural businesses, 
there is a legitimate concern about their access to credit. The concern is that worthwhile 
projects are being denied debt financing simply because they are undertaken by small firms. 
As many empirical studies support this concern, finance companies and other less traditional 
lenders, in providing funds to small businesses such as local microcredit institutions, credit 
unions or non-traditional venture capital institutions, become more important. Financial 
market segmentation with locally-based financial providers not only have the advantages of a 
lower information opacity, lower cost of monitoring and better grounds for establishing 
relationship lending, but also from bonding the provision of finance with a local interest in 
the operation of the small local businesses (tax to community budget, higher quality of life in 
the area). Yet the wealth accumulation potential in rural areas is limited; therefore, the credit 
supply can be expected to be affected by the liquidity constraint of such institutions. Also, the 
                                                        
47 Agricultural producer cooperatives would deserve separate attention. Nevertheless, they are 
represented only scarcely within the EU, mostly in NMS where they did not form spontaneously but 
exist as a heritage of pre-transition times. From a financial economics perspective, they represent a 
special case due to their property and decision-making rights structure, restricting their access to or 
reducing incentives for external investor equity. Nevertheless, more recent developments in 
cooperative agriculture allow for a combination of employed members (equity holders) with external 
investor equity. For a discussion of the financial characteristics of agricultural cooperatives, see 
Pederson and Gill (1990), Pederson (1998), Rathbone (1995), Rathbone and Wissman (1993), 
Rathbone and Davidson (1995).   
48 Public equity that imposes a large size condition is not considered as a financing option during this 
stage of the farms’ growth. 
49 Riskier securities mean that there is higher risk that its future value will change after the 
manager’s/farmer’s inside information is revealed to the investor or the security value will be adjusted 
to the true (unexpected momentary) risk of the undertaking. Obviously, debt contract mostly keeps the 
price of borrowing constant over the contractual period, or its changes reflect general changes in the 
capital market rather than insider information.  
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constrained access to financial institutions’ credit increases agricultural and rural business’ 
dependence on costly but more accessible trade credit and leasing50. To increase the 
availability of debt capital for projects with higher returns, agricultural and small borrowers 
need (more than other businesses) to be concerned with signalling51 and relationship finance, 
which can lower the cost and risk of lending to financial institutions.  
The information opacity specific to small (and young) businesses, and thus the higher cost of 
information asymmetries between the firms and potential providers of finance (when 
compared to larger firms), which is at the core of the financial growth continuum theory, is 
likely not the only reason for the small agricultural and rural business’ constrained access to 
finance. The agricultural and rural business’ access to finance can be also affected by other 
size-related factors such as: 
- high unit transaction costs of seeking credit from banks or micro-lenders, for example 
loan delays, travel costs, application fees, legal service costs and collateral titling costs 
(Key and Runsten, 1999); 
- higher unit costs of dealing with downstream and upstream agents, which can impact 
the firm’s success (contracting and stability) of product marketing, signalling growth 
potential to financiers;  
- lower potential for entrepreneurial activity diversification and thus economies of scope 
(higher risk of product price volatility and bankruptcy due to input/product market 
shocks, weather shocks in agriculture);  
- lower returns on capital due to diseconomies of scale and slower growth potential (also 
due to the imperfect functioning of other complementary input markets such as land); 
or 
- small size of collateral relative to often necessary lumpy investments (resulting in high 
interest rates, which reflect relatively high costs faced by money lenders in sourcing 
funds and servicing borrowers who do not have collateral (Simmons, 2002). 
Some of these points are further discussed below.  
Small firms face diseconomies of size in product marketing due to high unit transaction and 
transport costs. The transactions involved with building contractual relationships between a 
small firm and downstream agent also result in higher costs for the downstream agents; these 
are, however, due to imperfect competition with larger scale producers and increasing 
corporate concentration in trading, processing, manufacturing and retailing, which is passed 
back to the small firms in the form of lower product prices and other lesser quality terms of 
trade. Additionally, smaller firms have problems of obtaining long-term and quality contracts 
with downstream agents52 (e.g., in the food chain with processing industry), while successful 
product marketing (securing continuous sales and good prices) can constitute an important 
positive signal for potential financiers.    
Downstream and upstream agents can be providers of finance who have, in comparison with 
other institutional providers of finance, the advantage of knowledge and specialisation in or 
related to the borrower’s business activity.53 As the financiers within the supply chain select 
                                                        
50 Barry and Robison (2001), for example, argue that the financial characteristics of agriculture have 
encouraged an extensive farmland leasing market. 
51 See, for example, Zhao et al. (2008) for more discussion of the role of signalling in agricultural 
finance.  
52 This is not only related to higher costs of contract enforcement, but also to higher risk of 
performance volatility and production risk, especially in the case of small agricultural producers whose 
production is subjected to natural risk beyond their control. 
53 Important financing for small businesses provided within the supply chain is also working capital 
finance and trade credit, but downstream agents can also provide longer-term capital investment 
credits. 
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the firms to be provided with finance based on performance or growth potential indications 
(see e.g., Van Henck et al. 2011), signalling and relationship-building will also play an 
important role for small farms’ access to this type of funding. Even if building a relationship 
with a financier also improves access to credit from financial institutions, it can be expected 
that a relationship with an upstream or downstream agent will have a longer history, and the 
related specialisation of these agents reduces the information opacity of the small businesses.  
Another financial concern linked to the marketing conditions for small producers relates to 
the increased ability of product buyers to set product and process standards and their 
demands for reasons of traceability (Vorley and Fox, 2004). For small farms it is very costly 
or impossible to reach better contractual relations with downstream agents (buyers) if 
securing produce or process quality requires larger (lumpy) capital investments. This 
negative impact of (agro-) industrialisation in the processing industry could be mitigated by 
forming marketing cooperatives among small producers or contract “producing” (farming) 
with larger producers (e.g., Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al. 2000). Cooperatives not 
only improve access to institutional credit, but also increase the possibility of investing into 
lumpy product and process quality-increasing capital from shared internal funds. Within 
contract farming, subsidising various types of capital acquisition is used as contractual 
‘bonding’, (Runsten, 1992) with a positive effect for both contractual sites – small as well as 
large producers54. The existence of the dual farm structure with a large number of small 
farms and a significantly smaller number but significant market share of large scale farms in 
many NMS would suggest small scale farms’ tendency toward seeking contractual farming or 
forming cooperatives. This has been partially observed. However, it is also partially cramped 
by the pre-transition past-related distrust to the cooperative form of farming and conflicting 
relationships between restituted small farms and large scale farms which are mostly 
successors of former collective farms. 
5.2 Effect of tradition 
Although until now they have been treated mostly jointly, there are differences between small 
non-agricultural businesses and small agricultural business that can be expected to have an 
impact on their respective financing. As Berger and Udell (1998) discuss, many small non-
agricultural (non-craftsman) businesses disappear or are sold due to an owner’s retirement, 
while farming (possibly also craftsman) traditions in the case of small farms could lead to a 
higher average age of small agricultural businesses compared to non-agricultural business. In 
many cases the agricultural tradition also leads to farms’ being taken over (inherited) by their 
descendants, thus ensuring generational continuation. This could result in higher equity 
ratio, a long-term relationship to debt financiers and thus better access to smaller scale 
relation lending. This situation can be expected to exist in member states with mature 
economies (EU 15), but not necessarily in New Member States, where private individual and 
family farming was partially renewed first after the collapse of the socialist regime. This 
would then suggest that small farms in member states with mature market economies and an 
uninterrupted farming tradition will display lower leverage (higher collateral), thus improved 
access to institutional credit and a lower dependency on trade credit as well as leasing, than 
small farms in new member states. 
The tradition of small-scale (family) farm proprietorship can also represent a constraint with 
regard to equity financing. Small businesses are mostly owner-managed, which relates to the 
owners/managers incentive to external debt rather than external equity in order to keep 
ownership and control in the firm and transferring ownership to the next generation (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Barkley et al., 2001). Also, interest in maintaining, or reliance on the current 
business location, particularly in the case of agricultural businesses due to the non-
transferability of land, reduces the attractiveness of investments to venture capitalists 
                                                        
54 A larger producer represents the subsidising side of the contract and a small producer the recipient 
of the capital acquisition subsidy.  
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(Barkley et al., 2001). It can be assumed that less traditional non-agricultural firms will be 
less bound to single proprietorship and hence more open to partnerships and growth by 
allowing private equity investment. The tendency of preserving single or family 
proprietorship could be also stronger in agriculture due to the expectation of higher costs of 
joint ownership or agency costs in the case of delegating decision-making power to a 
manager. This could be supported by the argument that relatively higher riskiness and 
complexity of agricultural production provides a greater scope for disagreements between 
owners of different risk attitudes and owners and managers, who are generally less risk-
averse. 
5.3 High capital intensity 
Despite their predominantly small scale, farms (not necessarily rural businesses) are typically 
highly capital-intensive businesses characterised by investments in buildings, machinery, 
equipment, and, specific to the sector, farmland and breeding livestock. This high capital 
intensity is reflected in their significant share of real estate in total assets (Barry and Robison, 
2001). The land’s location and production alignment represents higher asset specificity, and 
thus a higher share of land holding, as well as a higher share of specific assets in total assets. 
This asset specificity then reduces the agricultural assets’ irreversibility and thus its liquidity 
and the potential of its use as credit collateral. Barry and Robison (2001), using U.S. 
Department of Agriculture data, show that the U.S. farms’ real estate comprises about 70% to 
80% of total assets from year to year, while their inventories of livestock, machinery, crops, 
and other non-real-estate farm assets generally make up 10% to 15% of total assets. European 
Commissions Farm Accountancy Data Network data (FADN EU public database) present a 
similar picture. In 2008, EU farm real estate represented 60% of total assets on average for 
all Member States.55 The EU share of real estate in total assets is slightly lower than in the 
U.S., but is nevertheless still high, representing lower asset liquidity when compared to other 
economic sectors. As Barry and Robison (2001) suggest, the high capital intensity and low 
asset liquidity create demand for longer-term financing and careful matching of repayment 
obligations with projected cash flows.  
Not only are there differences in the share of real estate in total assets between the EU 
Member States (MS), but existing empirical studies suggest that the resulting low liquidity 
effect on access to finance will also vary among Member States, mainly due to differences in 
credit evaluation procedures and other credit market institutions. As results of the study on 
firms’ financing policies by Colombo and Revoltella (2003) demonstrate, there are 
differences among EU MS regarding which assets can be used as collateral. For example, in 
the Czech Republic, inventories can be easier used as collateral than tangible assets. The 
authors suggest that this is a consequence of the divergence of book and the real value of 
assets characteristic for transition economies, which could thus be a problem also coming to 
light in other NMS.56 This constraint on the acceptance of tangible assets as credit collateral, 
which exists in some EU countries, amplifies the financial constraining effect of the sector-
specific capital structure.   
                                                        
55 The data from FADN EU public database show that there are significant differences in the share of 
real estates in total assets between EU 15 Member States and NMS. For EU 15, the ratio of real estate 
in total assets approximates with 67% the U.S. farms ratio of real estate in total assets. The share of 
real estates in total assets of 46% suggests significantly lower value of agricultural real estate in NMS 
than in EU 15. The EU average of this ratio is thus pulled down by the respective ratio values for NMS. 
Similarly, also share of inventory displays differences between EU 15 and NMS. It corresponds to 17% 
and 28% in total assets in EU 15 and NMS, respectively. These shares likely indicate lower value of the 
real estates in NMS and the need for modernisation. 
56 Myyrä et al. (2011) also point to differences in agricultural asset valuation among EU 15 Member 
States reflecting different farm business (expansion) strategies and accounting approaches or simply 
differences in agricultural asset markets (particularly in the land market).     
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5.4 Low debt-to-asset ratio 
Compared to other economic sectors (and possibly partially a result of the previously-
discussed factors), agriculture is also specific with regard to a relatively low range of debt-to-
asset ratio (financial leverage or gearing). Pietolla et al. (2011) report the financial leverage 
for EU agriculture, for which the geometric average from 1989 to 2008 is 14.6%. This rate has 
been relatively stable over the reported period, with only a few aberrations during the 
recession of 1980-90 and the start of the economic crises in 2007. Due to these factors, 
agricultural financial leverage reached 17.9% in 2008. Pietolla et al. (2011) point to large 
variability in the degree of financial leverage between EU countries. In 2008 the lowest 
leverage was in Greek agriculture, at 0.6%, and highest in Denmark at 49%. With a nearly 
50% leverage score for agriculture, Denmark is above the average leverage of non-
agricultural firms in most European countries. However, the leverage average for European 
agricultural businesses is considerably lower than the average of European non-agricultural 
businesses. For example, one of the lowest average firm financial leverage ratios of 21% can 
be found in the United Kingdom (Gaud et al., 2005)57 and the highest, with 50%, can be 
found in either the Czech Republic or Latvia58 (Hanousek and Shanshur, 2011). The overall 
lower leverage in agriculture than in other economic sectors could partially be a result of 
different accounting standards (Barry and Robison, 2001)59, but also lower asset liquidity and 
specificity. Thus, agriculture is more financially constrained. 
As with differences in the share of real estate in total assets, there are also marked differences 
in leverage rations between the EU 15 and NMS in the level of average financial leverage (see 
Hanousek and Shanshur, 2011). Again, the overall higher leverage scores in NMS could 
reflect lower equity value and higher need for modernisation than their Western 
counterparts. The NMS and EU 15 countries’ differences are less obvious when examining 
financial leverage of agriculture only, which could reflect the significant variability in 
agricultural production structure and related capital intensity, including ‘old’ member states.  
5.5 Low return to investment and low growth sector  
Despite the evidence of reasonable solvency, agriculture is characterised by relatively low and 
volatile current rates-of-return to farm assets, which are reflected in chronic liquidity 
problems and cash flow pressures (e.g., Barry and Robison, 2001; Zhao et al, 2008). The low 
rates-of-return to farm assets mainly result from inelastic food demand, which leads to rapid 
downward adjustment of product prices and reduces the cost advantages of new production 
technologies and practices. In addition to the negative effect of low and volatile return-to-
capital and liquidity problems on the sector’s debt-serving capacity and creditworthiness, the 
low returns-to-capital result in agriculture lacking high growth prospects. Instead of 
elaborating further on the relationship of the low growth prospects to debt financing, this 
section emphasises the less-discussed issue of the effect of the low growth prospect on start-
up or expansion investment in agricultural and rural businesses through equity financing. 
Low returns to capital and low growth prospects are also characteristic of other small rural 
businesses that are important for serving local communities, which suffer from diseconomies 
of scale and disadvantages of (i) geographic remoteness from more concentrated markets, 
and (ii) locations that were traditionally agricultural and offer no other or limited natural 
resource advantages. This characteristic of low growth prospects is then particularly 
                                                        
57 Gaud et al. (2005) use data from Worldscope® on 13 European countries from 1988-2000. 
58 The authors analyse data on seven NMS – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland and Slovakia, which is derived from AMADEUS pan-European database from 1996-2006. 
59 Farms can use current market values of farm real estate compared with original cost-adjusted book 
values for depreciable assets in other sectors (Irwin, 1968 in Barry and Robison, 2001). Also, there is a 
significantly higher share of non-depreciable assets in the agricultural asset structure (Barry et al., 
1995 in Barry and Robison, 2001).   
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important for the option of raising venture capital.60 Drabenstott and Meeker (1999) identify 
the constrained access to equity capital, which is critical for new business start-ups and 
business expansion, as a major challenge for rural economic development. These authors 
point out that the low growth prospects are the main reason why agricultural and other rural 
entrepreneurs and businesses often end up turning to friends, family, or independent wealthy 
investors in the community (angels) to fund new ventures. Not only do larger venture 
capitalists screen for investment opportunities, mainly in businesses with fast growth 
potential and thus high returns on their investment (typically over 30%), they also tend to 
specialise in sectors known for these potentials, or where these potentials are expected. 
Motivation for this lies in the necessary build-up of expertise that private equity 
intermediaries have to invest in. The generally low returns on capital and low growth 
potential of agricultural and rural businesses thus provide low incentives for venture 
capitalists to acquire costly specialised knowledge for this type of undertaking, which would 
be necessary for effectively screening their investments. This could lead to disregarding some 
fast-growth agricultural or rural businesses for venture investment.  
As the venture capital survey by the European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association 
(2002) shows, some agriculture-related sectors attract private equity investors. 
Biotechnology attracts a significant share of European venture investments (almost 20% of 
total seed and start-up venture capital investments). Agriculture, on the other hand, was 
supported only in its expansion stage, only by minor venture capital investment 
(approximately 1% of total expansion venture capital investments). Nevertheless, to brace 
and ensure the effects of investments in biotechnology development, venture capital 
investors may be motivated to invest in and oversee larger agricultural companies, where 
biotechnology, for example improved or genetically modified crop varieties, are extensively 
applied. A notable share of private equity also flows into consumer-related industries (8% of 
total expansion equity). New consumer preferences in food consumption and lifestyle trends 
that form new or yet unexhausted market potentials can influence investors’ portfolio choices 
and represent equity financing potential for agricultural producers.61 Also, by increasing 
energy demands, technology and policy developments have created new market growth 
potential for renewable energies, including bioenergy. Integrated in the conventional 
agricultural commodity structure, energy crop production could facilitate equity financing of 
agricultural businesses.62 Growth-oriented agricultural producers can, therefore, open their 
door to equity financing by reflecting on consumer preferences and/or new technology 
developments, or through integration into the value (supply) chain with the potential of an 
investment spill-over effect. 
Despite these technological and market potentials, for small agricultural and rural 
businesses, traditional equity financing remains inaccessible. This increases the importance 
of non-traditional venture capital institutions for agricultural and rural business start-ups 
and expansions.63 The non-traditional venture capital institutions can operate in rural 
                                                        
60 This issue is rarely discussed in the context of European agriculture and rural entrepreneurship. In 
the US, there have been several attempts to research the issue of constrained access to equity market 
taking the form, for example, of a Rural Equity Capital Initiative funded by the USDA Fund for Rural 
America or "Rural Conferences" at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.   
61 An example of an investment company that invests in agricultural and agriculture-related businesses 
is Sherbrooke Capital Fund, which is dedicated exclusively to providing growth and expansion capital 
to emerging companies in the Health and Wellness industry. Sherbrooke encompasses investments in 
food production and processing companies that specialise in the production of safe, high quality foods. 
62 For example, Germany’s first agricultural (land-cultivating) company listed on the stock exchange, 
KTG Agrar AG, included bio-energy production, as well as organic commodity production in its 
business activity structure likely for the abovementioned reasons.     
63 Barkley et al. (2001, p. 1) defined non-traditional venture capital institutions as “funds or programs 
established to address venture capital needs and/or to enhance economic development prospects in 
regions and industries underserved by traditional venture capital funds.” 
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markets due to assistance or subsidies from public or private organisations, or because of 
goals other than maximising profits from investments such as social and economic benefits to 
the service area (Barkley et al., 2001). Individual investors or other funding sources64 that 
capitalise this type of venture capital institution thus have to value economic and social 
returns in addition to financial returns.65 There has been, however, no research done on the 
existence of such capital institutions in Europe.  
5.6 High exposure to risk 
One of the main challenges for agricultural finance is the complex risk environment that 
agricultural businesses are exposed to (Barry and Robison, 2001; Wenner, 2010). Among 
these are risks related to market price volatility, changes in consumer preferences and 
alternative uses of land, structural changes in the downstream industry, changing support 
policies, and particularly risk resulting from lengthy biologically-based and/or weather-
sensitive production.66 Agriculture is hence inherently a risky economic activity. The large 
array of uncontrollable elements affecting agricultural production, supply, and thus prices 
results in highly variable economic returns (Wenner, 2010).  
Because of the uncertainty of the size of returns on investment projects, lenders will be 
reluctant to lend to agricultural business, unless modern instruments of risk management 
such as agricultural insurance, futures contracts, or guarantee funds that mitigate risk are 
utilised. Therefore, risk-related conditions place a high value on farm risk management 
(Barry and Robison, 2001). Depending on the farm structure in the EU member states, some 
types of insurance institutions could be more suitable than others. In countries where small 
scale farms are predominant, micro-insurance may be most suitable for reducing risk and 
thus facilitating access to (micro-) finance. Since there are differences in the availability or 
efficiency of the use of risk management instruments, as well as in farm financial literacy 
across EU countries, particularly between EU 15 and NMS, the high degree of agriculture- 
specific risk can be expected to have diverse impacts on farm access to finance across the EU. 
5.7 Geographic dispersion and lack of coordination of rural capital 
demand  
The low population and business density in rural areas represents another specific 
characteristic of rural undertakings with an effect on agricultural and rural business finance. 
The low concentration of demand for finance in rural areas results in high transaction costs 
for financial suppliers – including higher time and travel costs for identifying investment 
prospects, conducting due diligence, costs of monitoring related to distance (Brophy and 
Mourtada, 1999; Barkley et al., 2001; Drabenstott and Meeker, 1999), and consequently 
higher costs of capital for rural businesses. This rural areas-specific higher cost creates a 
situation where entrepreneurs may not be able to undertake viable projects (Kriz et al. 2000).  
Another geography-related impediment to traditional debt as well as to equity finance, 
especially venture capital, is the lack of a favourable local business environment. As Barkley 
et al. (2001) state, the smaller size of rural markets offer relatively limited business 
infrastructure and human capital to facilitate the management of new companies; investors 
thus may have the additional expense of acquiring business services and managerial and 
technical personnel from outside the area or providing extensive technical assistance to 
                                                        
64 Based on the U.S. experience, these sources of funds can be state (country) or local government, 
nonprofit foundations, Community Development Finance Institutions, Small Business Administration 
agencies, commercial banks, or pension funds.   
65 For the various types of capitalisation, organisational and management structure, or the investment 
goals of non-traditional venture capital institutions, see Barkley et al. (2001). 
66 The lengthiness of agricultural production, especially crop production, increases the impact 
probability of weather shocks. Also, livestock production with livestock susceptible to uncontrollable 
diseases represents an uncertain undertaking. Farm economic results are thus highly unstable. 
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existing company management. In this context, Brophy and Mourtada (1999) argue that if 
rural areas are to gain access to equity and debt markets, they must develop effective demand 
for capital and express that demand to these markets by creating interactive economic 
networks within, among, and outside their communities. These authors strongly emphasise 
the need to identify competitive advantages67 for businesses in rural areas through 
entrepreneurial clusters to generate a sufficiently high rate of (economic as well as social) 
return to attract investors and gain public support. The authors further claim that the market 
links and participation can be strengthened through joint efforts of public policy and the 
active involvement of private sector participants, especially the investment community and 
the population interested in living and working as entrepreneurs and employees in rural 
areas. As mentioned above, such joint efforts could be effectively used toward forming non-
traditional (mainly non-profit) financial intermediation (Barkley et al., 2001).  
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
Financial capital represents means that enable the acquisition of real capital where it can be 
applied, with positive returns. Without access to capital markets that in turn facilitate access 
to external finance, firm investments could not be realised to optimal levels given the firm 
productive and market potentials. As is well-documented in the theoretical and empirical 
bodies of literature, the main role of capital markets lies in enabling the effective relocation of 
finance from purchasing power to productive demand, i.e., to those who can use it most 
profitably. However, capital markets are vastly recognised as imperfect, which leads to 
under-investment, under-employment of production factors and underproduction, thereby 
suppressing the rate of return on investments, technology adoption, and productivity (e.g., 
Hubbard and Kashyap 1992; Vasavada and Chambers 1996; Bierlen and Featherstone 1998; 
Barry et al. 2000).  
Identifying the sources of capital market imperfections, as well as the factors of their possible 
mitigation, is therefore highly important in understanding economic development. 
Furthermore, exploring the characteristics of firms and production (assets), with which the 
severity of capital market imperfections and their effects systematically changes, facilitates a 
transfer of this knowledge to specific sectors, namely agriculture.  
This deliverable elaborates on these issues by reviewing a wide spectrum of financial 
economics literature. It offers a comprehensive overview and systematisation of the 
determinants of financial capital use as discussed in this literature. The theoretical discussion 
provides verifiable arguments on why some capital market conditions provide rationally-
behaving agents with great constraints on his or her economic behaviour and decision-
making, and why these conditions occur. There are three relevant questions regarding the 
determinants of firms’ financial capital use: i) What determines the demanded volume of 
financial capital? ii) Why does the supply of finance not perfectly correspond with this 
demand? In other words, why are firms financially constrained? iii) What impacts firms’ 
choices of financial capital sources (capital structure)? The first two questions refer to the 
basic question of how much financial capital firms use and why, and the third question calls 
for an answer to in what structure firms use their financial capital. 
                                                        
67 Brophy & Mourtada (1999, p. 155) suggest that “the comparative economic advantage must be 
identified and developed by local people willing to commit time, energy, and capital to initiating and 
working to grow business entities dedicated to the pursuit of that advantage. This advantage can be 
found relative to local product and service needs, import substitutes, or exports. It may be stimulated 
by efforts of local state universities, trade and service organisations, local companies, and financial 
institutions. When local entrepreneurs discover and act upon wealth-creating local comparative 
advantage, they will make the first equity investments and will do so more willingly if they see the 
opportunity to gain access to sources of equity capital beyond local resources for growth of the equity 
base.” 
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Following Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) capital structure irrelevancy theorem, if capital 
markets were perfect, the supply of financial capital would reflect the efficient demand on 
real capital and the financial decision would have no impact on the value of the firm. The first 
question, “What determines the demanded volume of financial capital?” is therefore closely 
related to the question “What determines the volume of physical (real) capital 
(unconstrained) demand?” which is discussed in deliverable 4.2. The theoretical discussion 
presented in this deliverable hence focuses on the remaining two aforementioned questions. 
The determinants of financial capital use relevant to this deliverable are categorised in three 
groups: i) financial capital use-constraining factors, i.e. factors associated with capital market 
imperfections, ii) factors mitigating these imperfections or their impacts, and iii) firm- and 
production-related factors, which alter the severity of the financial constraints.  
The two main sources of finance considered throughout the text are debt and equity. In some 
sections, financing through leasing, which is a widely-used financial source in agriculture, is 
also discussed. Agency theory, property rights theory, and transaction costs economics, 
among other theoretical approaches, have provided a theoretical basis for identifying the 
determinants of capital market imperfections. Asymmetric information and conflicting 
incentive structures between firms and providers of finance result in a higher risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and lead to finance rationing and financial constraints to the 
firms. Similar effects also provide weak property rights and incomplete contracting. Explicit 
and implicit transaction costs, which relate to external financing, also represent a source of 
capital market imperfection.  
The market has the capacity to respond to capital market imperfections with adjustments in 
governance structures and the formulation of suitable market-supporting institutions. 
Financial intermediation or practices such as differential loan pricing, lines of credit, 
collateral requirements, or other covenants incorporated in financial contracts are posited to 
mitigate problems of incentive misalignment. Other practices, for example, signalling, 
relationship lending, or trade credit as a form of vertical financial contracting, can be utilised 
to reduce information problems. Regulations and a general legal system are important for the 
efficient functioning of capital markets, as are other institutions that reduce information 
deficiencies. In the case of systematic financial constraints affecting particular firm groups or 
markets that serve the public interest, government policies might be required to assist with 
resolutions.    
Since capital market imperfections result in costs that vary among financing options, firms 
need to optimise capital structure to maximise its value. The trade-off theory of capital 
structure suggests that a firm optimises its debt ratio by considering the trade-off between 
the costs (cost of financial distress) and benefits (interest tax shields) of borrowing, which 
vary with firm leverage (financial risk) and production-related risks (profitability, earning 
volatility or asset specificity). The pecking order theory of finance, on the other hand, 
postulates that costs of asymmetric information and costs of financial distress induce firms to 
sequence financing, starting with the use of retained earnings, followed with debt. Equity is 
considered the least preferred form of funding due to the costs of issuing new equity and 
agency costs that are assumed to be particularly high due to severe information asymmetries 
between firms and potential investors. The theory of the firm financial growth continuum 
further presents the changing financing options of firms in points on their growth 
continuum, and emphasises the constraining effect of information opacity of small firms in 
their early stages of growth. 
The theory of firm growth continuum mentioned above is highly relevant to agriculture, 
where a majority of firms can fall into the category of small businesses. However, farms can 
be considered financially constrained not only due to their size. High capital intensity, low 
returns on investment and innovation, low-growth potential, a high exposure to risk, 
geographic remoteness, and the dispersion of demand for financial capital, as well as 
tradition, all represent farm or sectoral characteristics, which can limit farms in their access 
to financial capital. Small size, geographic remoteness and dispersion of demand for financial 
capital, possibly also tradition and low-growth prospects, can also characterise non-
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agricultural rural businesses. As a result of these specific factors, farms and rural business 
mostly have a non-corporate governance structure, which precludes the availability of 
numerous finance instruments and access to funding sources, mainly equity, and increases 
their dependency on financing through retained earnings and debt.  
Based on the theoretical discussion, significant variation in financing options and choices are 
expected between EU member states. In other deliverables, the documented differences in 
capital intensity and leverage support this expectation. Differences in farm sizes and 
governance (corporate) structures, farming tradition and length of farm-financier 
relationships, functioning of land markets, as well as legal and institutional environments 
securing contract enforceability or the protection of property rights and minority 
shareholders can be found between EU 15 member states and new member states. These 
could suggest greater credit constraints to small farms in new member states, but also greater 
potential for equity financing of investments in larger partnerships and corporate farms, 
which, to be extracted, requires the establishment of new equity market-supporting 
institutions. 
Little is known about equity financing of agricultural and rural businesses in general. Scarce 
existing research, however, suggests that if rural areas were to gain access to equity (as well 
as debt) markets, they must develop effective demand for financial capital and communicate 
that demand to these markets. This also requires identifying competitive advantages for 
businesses in rural areas to generate a higher rate of economic as well as social returns, which 
would mobilise local angel and venture investors. Networking across the communities’ 
borders could attract further investors and help to gain public support. Non-traditional 
financial intermediaries could play an important role in this process. Rural business could 
further benefit from exploring other possibilities of mitigating financial constraints, for 
example, by inquiring into financing options offered by vertical and horizontal contracting, 
diversification to reduce production risk, or more extensive application of risk management 
practices.  
Since financial constraints greatly affect the adjustment and development capacities of 
agricultural and non-agricultural rural businesses, differences in capital markets and 
institutions across the EU could lead to increasing disparities in economic development 
between European regions, particularly rural regions. The deliverable, therefore, concludes 
by calling for empirical research on regional differences in capital market imperfections. This 
should focus not only on identifying sources of capital market imperfections, but also various 
uses of practices that mitigate these imperfections. A significant research gap is particularly 
found in (the potential for) the development of (rural) private equity markets. Numerous 
other deliverables within the Factor Markets Project respond to this research call. 
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